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Conglomerate mergers have been keenly watched, and
Indeed, the most discussed of all mergers In the history of
the American economy.
A conglomerate merger Is any merger that Is neither
vertical nor horizontal. The term has no precise meaning,
however. It usually refers to a company that grows quickly by
acquiring other companies In many completely unrelated fields
of business. The products acquired and the acquiring firms
are not competitive. Thus, a completely conglomerate merger
produces a firm having a number of external markets equal to
the sum of the pre-merger external markets of the acquiring
and the acquired firms. Anything less puts the merger, at
least partially. Into a horizontal or vertical merger category.
It Is the purpose of this thesis to trace, by periods
of greatest activity, aspects of the growth and development
of the merger movement In the American economy. The analysis
deals with the four periods of Industrialization activity:
1890-1919, 1920-1944, 1945-1959 and the current conglomerate
mergers of the 1960-1970 period.
Chapter I presents a discussion of Industrialization
from 1890-1959 which portrays the causes of concentration,
the segment of greatest concentration, and the factors that
contributed to slowing down these movements.
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Chapter II is allocated to the current period of
corporate mergers emphasizing, as in the previous chapter;
the economic environments, the causes of concentration, the
segments of greatest concentration, and the major factors
responsible for slowing the merger movement.
Chapter III investigates the basic legislative view¬
points and the present anti-trust lawa-that are applicable to
conglomerate mergers. A presentation is made of landmark
cases dealing with conglomerate mergers that were prosecuted
by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Chapter IV considers the effects that mergers have had
on regional developments and on consumers.
In Chapter V the conclusion, analysis seeks to compare
and contrast the similarities and differences that existed
among the merger movements in the considered periods.
CHAPTER I
BUSINESS CONSOLIDATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Trust Era
The novel characteristic of the trust is not the fact
that it is a monopoly, but that it is a monopoly formed by
combining several competitors according to a new plan in the
formation of a trust. The different firms or companies who
have been competing with each other in the production and
sale of goods agree to place the management of all of their
several properties in the hands of a board of trustees. The
powers of this board and its relation to the owners of the
various properties are ingeniously devised to evade the common
law, which declared that controls in restraint of competition
were against public policy and legal.^ The trust has been
considered Illegal in the United States since its passage of
the Sherman Anti-trust Act in 1890.
Trust was Introduced as early as 1879 and 1882 by the
Standard Oil Company. This firm was followed by the formation
of another trust in 1887, called the "Whiskey Trust," then the
"Sugar Trust," (Sugar Refineries Company), the "Lead Trust,"
^Charles W. Baker, Monopoly and the People (New York;
G. P. Pulman’s and Sons, 1889), p. 8.
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the "Cotton Oil Trust" (1884), and by others in succeeding
years.^
The first modern trust, the Standard Oil Trust, was a
combination formed among several of the refiners of crude
petroleum in the states of Pennsylvania and Ohio in the year
1879. The history of the oil business is of particular signi¬
ficance in the study of industrial combination, for the rise
and progress of the standard oil company Illustrates practically
every phase in the development and methods of monopoly under
American conditions.
The second greatest trust to attract the general public's
attention was the American Cotton Oil Trust (1887) , in which
some of the same men who had so successfully engineered the
Standard Oil combination were heavily Interested.
During the same year of the formation of the American
Cotton Oil Trust, the price per gallon of linseed oil rose
from thirty-eight cents to fifty-two cents; and this price
was kept up or exceeded during 1888. This is to say, every
purchaser of linseed oil, or everyone who had occasion to have
painting done, paid to the member of this trust for every
gallon of oil that he used, about fourteen cents over and
above the sum which he would have paid if competition were
allowed to do its usual work in keeping down prices.
The trusts directly affect the public in another way
which has received far less attention than it deserves.
^Harold V. Faulkner, American Economic History (New
York: Harper and Row Co., 1960), p. 429.
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Besides the people who use the linseed oil and pay the trust
and extra fourteen cents a gallon for the privilege, there
are a great number of others who would have used oil If the
price had not advanced, but they could afford to do so at
the advanced price. It Is a well-known fact that every
Increase In the price of any article decreases the demand and
the advance In the price of linseed oil undoubtedly had a
great effect In decreasing the consumption of oil. At the
trust's prices there were more linseed oil mills In the
country than were needed to supply the demands, yet If the
prices had been lowered to the point where full competition
would fix, there would probably have been demand enough to
keep all the mills running. The fact that fewer people can
afford to paint their houses because of the higher price of
the oil, ascertain that there will be less employment for
painters; and as less paint Is used, all those Interested In
and employed In the paint trade would be sufferers. It Is
to be remembered that the writer speaks the linseed oil trust
only to make the case more vivid. The principle In the
general applies equally well to other trusts. The loss of
employment by thousands In refineries controlled by the sugar
trust. In the Fall of 1888 Is a case In point. Still another
affect of this trust's action Is to be especially noted: the
fact that the diminished production of oil lessens the demand
for seed; and also that In the purchase of seed, as well as In
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the sale of oil, the trust had killed competition.
The trust which gave absolute power to the trustees
created a monopoly, opposition to which produced anti-trust
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laws on the part of various states in 1889 and later the
passing of the Sherman Anti-trust Act by the Federal govern¬
ment in 1890. The early prosecutions by the federal courts
under the Sherman Act were generally unsuccessful, but the
dissolution of the Northern River Sugar Refining Company by
the New York Court of Appeals in 1890 and of the Standard Oil
Trust by the Ohio Courts in 1892 put a decisive damper upon
this method of consolidation. These two cases were decided
on the grounds that the creation of a trust had violated
rights granted in the charter and not on the grounds that
monopolies had been created. In any trust the decisions
were accepted by the corporations. The panic of 1893 and the
succeeding years of depression held up temporarily the
aggressive moves toward consolidation.
Holding Companies
The depression of 1893-1896 brought about a general
collapse of informal agreement giving rise to a new form of
consolidation, the holding company. It was the dominant form
of consolidation from 1897 to 1904. It also gave emphasis to
the merger movement. During the period between 1984 through
1919, one or more corporations casually chartered in New Jersey
were formed to acquire a control over important competing
plants in the principal line of industry. Some of the trust
leaders specifically formed corporations to hold the stock of
competing companies; other business concerns set about to
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control competition by buying the stocks of their competitors.
This kind of action gave rise to the concentration movement.^
Since the 1870*s, the tendency has been to consolidate.
Most of the witnesses who appeared before the Industrial
Commission in 1899 believed that "the competition was so
vigorous that profits of nearly all competing establishments
were destroyed." They felt that such competition was the
chief motivating force for business combination, and served
as the prime cause which led many to unite to escape from
being driven to the wall.
The bitter rate wars of the railroads during the early
seventies had driven fares and rates below the overall costs
of transportation. Competition was so excessive in the sugar
refineries, for example, that eighteen out of about forty
refineries had failed before consolidation has begun.^
There were also the Inherent losses of competition due
to cost of advertising and salesmen, and because small indus¬
tries were not able to utilize their by-products, to secure
the best management and bargaining with labor, bankers, and
transportation companies.
The Industrial Revolution, the control of patents and
the huge promoter's profits contributed to the concentration
movement.^ It made big business possible through the invention
^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York:
Harper and Row, 1905), p. 49.
^Harold Faulkner, American Economy History (New York:
Harper and Row, 1954), p. 42.
^Ibid. , p. 422.
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of labor-saving machinery. These machines made large scale
production profitable. The heavy fixed Investment In expensive
machinery and apparatus discouraged competition. The Invention
of typewriters, adding machines, and many other appliances
contributed necessary elements to the age of big business.^
Under prevailing law, the Inventor of a novel process
or method of production, productive machinery, or product,
secured from the federal government an exclusive patent on
the process, machine, or product for a period of seventeen
years. The patent was essentially a grant of legal monopoly
for a specified time Interval (made available as an Incentive
to Invention and to the disclosure of Inventions). It generally
gave the patentee (or those to whom he assigned his rights)
exclusive right In the use of the process or machinery or sale
of the product. Patents also gave the exclusive rights on
g
strategic productive techniques or product designs.
The normal duration of the legal monopoly conferred
under the patent Is applied for and the usual application
remains pending In the patent office for three years more.
The period of pending may be further extended by the withdrawal
and amendment of application and through the Initiation of
Interference proceeding by the patent office when two applica¬
tions appear to cover the same ground. For example, the
Frltts patent causing the methods by which a sound track Is
^Ibld. , p. 423.
g
Joe Bains, Industrial Organization (New York; John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 173.
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Implanted on a film was applied for In 1880. It was pending
for 36 years and Issued In 1916, thus affording Its owners
Q
legal protection for more than half a century.
The duration of monopoly may be prolonged by dividing
a complicated Identlon Into several parts: the stops In a
process; the elements In a compound, or the sections of a
machine; and applying for separate patents at judicious Inter¬
vals. The Hartford-Emplre Company, the owner of a patent
covering a machine used In the manufacture of glass containers,
after being held In pendency for 15 years had others Issued
successively In 1925, 1928, 1937, and 1938. The final one
expiring 44 years after the first application was received.
During the life of a basic patent. Its owner will seek to
develop and patent Improvements. They will also be the only
buyer to whom patents on Improvements made by others can be
sold. When one patent has expired another will be ready to
take Its place. During the period of patent protection, a
firm may have developed a productive organization, market
outlets, control own materials and a monopoly of skilled
personnel that will make It difficult. If not Impossible, for
others to enter the field when Its patents have expired.
The monopoly power offered by patents has been extended
horizontally from one patent product to another and from
Q
Harold Faulkner, American Economy History (New York:
Harper and Row Publishing Co., 1960), p. 424.
^^Clalr Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business
(Chicago: Richard Irwin, Inc., rev. ed., 1960), p. 170.
^^Ibld. . p. 170.
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patented to non-patented goods. The shoe manufacturer, who
leased one of his machines from the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, also obtained the rest of his machinery and
supplies from United Shoe Company. The canner, who leased
his canning machinery from American Can or Continental Can,
also bought his cans from the same concern, and the office
that has leased an International Business Machine. Monopoly
has also been extended vertically from one stage of production
and distribution to the next. The Hartford-Emplre patents
covered a machine used In making glass containers, but they
were used not only to monopolize the container machinery
business but also to cartelize the container Industry Itself.
Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, under Its patent on tetroethyl,
forbade licensed refiners to sell anti-rock gasoline to any
but licensed jobbers. By fixing prices on Its jobber licenses
It controlled the distribution as well as the production of
12
this gasoline.
The large corporation which usually obtained a steady
flow of patents through assignments from Its own employees.
United Shoe, with 500 men In Its research division and 25
patent layers on Its legal staff. Is said to have acquired
nearly 4,200 patents between 1930 and 1947 and to have had
400 patent applications pending and 450 other Inventions on
hand In 1947. General Electric was said to have control of
more than 8,000 patents In 1939, and American Telephone and
^^Ibld. . p. 171.
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Telegraph Company was reported to own more than 9,250 and to
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hold licenses under some 6,000 others.
Large companies have sometimes undertaken to fortify
position of monopoly by accumulating an arsenal of patents to
be used In attacking possible competitors. Hartford-Emplre,
according to Its policy memorandum, applied for patents
designed "to block the development of machines which might be
constructed by other companies for the same purpose, as machines
using alternative means, and for other patents" on possible
Improvements of competing machines so as to fence In those and
prevent their reaching an Improved stage.
Litigation has been deliberately employed as a weapon
of monopoly. Between 1877 to 1893, when the first Bell patent
expired, the telephone company Initiated more than 600 Infringe¬
ment suits. Similarly, suits were employed to build the power
of National Cash Register, Eastman Kodak, and United Shoe
Machinery.
The monopoly power also aided consolidation through the
huge promoter’s profit motives, the formation of new organiza¬
tions and higher profit speculation, as In the case of Standard
oil. It was large enough to effect a monopoly. The age of
steel began In 1865. The high profits to be made In steel
also tempted consolidation, like Andrew Carnegie In steel, who
like other great consolldatlonlsts of his times built up his
^^Wllcox, Public Policies Toward Business (Chicago;
Richard Irwin, Inc., rev. ed., 1960), p. 176.
l^Ibld.
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company. He obtained rebates from railroads on his shipment
so that he could cut his costs, and hence his prices. And, he
bought out vital concerns that could not meet his competition.
The machines of the age of steel could not run without
lubrication, and so another vast enterprise came Into being,
the petroleum Industry. The age of steel started the oil rush
as promoters searched for and found other fields. By the
1870’s, nearly 40 million barrels of petroleum had been pro¬
duced. Oil had advanced to fourth place among the nation's
exports, and the annual production was approaching 20 million
1 *5
barrels.
The Sherman Act was passed In 1890 and had two major
provisions. In Section I: Every contract which was a comblna
tlon In the form of a trust or otherwise or conspiracy. In
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, was hereby declared to be Illegal.
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage In any
such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor...
Section 2; Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with other person
or persons, to monopolize any post of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations shall be
deemed dlsdemeanor...
The Sherman Act was passed In 1890 during President




Congress was to fight combinations, but due to the political
weakness, he did not Instruct the Department of Justice to
proceed vigorously under Its terms. Therefore, there were
only seven suits during his administration.^^
There Is some general agreement that the major reason
for the Ineffectiveness of the Sherman Act Is the fact that
public authorities, judical and legislative, have not had the
will nor the desire to enforce the law politically.
The Cleveland Administration (1895 to 1897) was also
characterized by political weakness. The Attorney-General,
Richard Olney Instituted only six proceedings under the Sherman
Act, and all six cases were brought against labor unions and
labor leaders.In 1895, the United States Supreme Court
refused to permit the American Sugar-Refining Companies from
buying the plants of four competitors, although the purchases
gave the firm control of 95 percent of the refining of the
country. The Court contented that "commerce succeeds to manu¬
facture, and Is not a part of It." Therefore, the Sherman Act
did not pertain.^®
Between the Civil War and the turn of the century,
there was a great Increase In corporate manufacturing, so by
1900, close to two-third of manufacturing output was produced
by corporations.
^^Harold Faulkner, American Economy History (New York:
Harper and Row, 1954), p. 422.
^^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 107.
18
Robert Patton and Clinton Worne, The Development of
American Economy (Chicago: Ed Scott Foresman and Co.,1963),
p. 248.
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The First Merger Movement 1894-1919
Toward the end of the nlnteenth century there was the
first great merger movement culminating In the formation of
the United States Steel Corporation as a merger of mergers In
1901. The pattern of this merger In this period Is shown In
Chart I which Indicates the number of mergers reported In the
Commercial and Financial chronicle, year by year from 1895 to
1914. It does not Include all the mergers but presumably
Includes all the Important mergers. As can be seen on Chart 1,
there was a great burst of mergers from 1898 to 1902. All of
this led to a great Increase In manufacturing. Insplte of the
concentration by mergers, a third of manufacturing output was
still produced by unincorporated enterprise.
A very sharp peak In 1899 and a heavy volume of mergers
In 1900, 1901, and 1902, then fell off. The 1899 burst was
characterized by the merger of many mdelum size firms, while
the 1901 burst was characterized by the merger of fewer and
larger firms.
In the short span of three years there was a great
change In the situation. A merger movement started In 1898
and left almost the whole steel Industry by the end of 1900
In the hand of a few companies. Table I shows various com¬
panies and their authorized capital that became a part of
19
Ralph L. Nelson.Merger Movements In American Industry
1895-1956. (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1959), p. 120.
9 n
Harry L. Purdy,Corporative Concentratlve and Public
Policy (New York; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1942), p. 25.
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LEADING COMBINATIONS IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, 1898-1900
Year of In¬
corporation Name of Organization
Authorized
Capital
1898 American Steel & Wire Co. of
Illinois $ 24,000,000
American Tin Place Co. 50,273,000
American Car & Foundry Co. 60,000,000
American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. 20,000,000
Empire Steel & Iron Co. 10,000,000
Federal Steel Co. 230,217,179
National Enameling & Stamping Co. 30,600,000
Pressed Steel Car Co. 25,000,000
Republic Iron & Steel Co. 55,000,000
Sloss-Shefleld Steel & Iron Co.
U, S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry
23,835,000
Company 30,000,000
Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. 20,000,000
1899 American Steel & Wire Co, of
New Jersey 70,156,000
American Steel Hoop Co. 33,000,000
National Steel Co. 61,561,000
National Tube Co. 80,000,000
1900 American Bridge Co. 70,156,000
American Sheet Steel Co. 54,000,000
Carnegie Company of N. J. 345,081,813
Crucible Steel Co. of America 50,000,000
Shelby Steel Tube Co. 15,000,000
The Bessemer process has been displaced to a considerable
extent by the open hearth method. Since Impurities can be
disposed of more readily In the latter. It Is able to use pig
Iron of widely varying chemical analysis.
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United States Steel Corporation in the three year period.
Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901. One of
the most important issues before the country was the control
of trusts and monopolies. During President Roosevelt’s
administration, the term "Trustbusting" became a fixed term
in the public imagination. He divided trusts into two classes
—"good and bad trusts"—and declared that, "we draw the line
against misconduct, not against wealth." Good trusts, he vowed,
operated and carried on their activities with a view to public
welfare, trading fairly and passing on their economic gains to
consumers. On the other hand, "bad trusts" controlled by
malefactors of great wealth were selfishly seeking their own
Interests and had little concern for the public.
President Roosevelt ordered Attorney-General Knox to
bring suit against the Standard Oil Company, the American
Tobacco Company, Dupont Power Trust Company, and others. There
were forty-eight suits during the era of President Roosevelt.
The most spectacular Supreme Court decision regarding
the Sherman Act was not an industrial combination but in
connection with a plan to combine a number of railroads in
the Northwest. A holding company was formed in 1901 which
took over all the stock in the Great Northern, Northern Pacific,
and Burlington Lines in which the Morgan and Hill group held
^^Donald Grunewald, Public Policy and the Modern Corpora¬
tion (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 30.
2 2
Arthur C. Binning, The Rise of the American Economic
Life (New York: Scribner’s and Sons, 1955), p. 39.
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controlling interest. President Roosevelt instructed Attorney-
General Knox to bring suit against the above mentioned companies
under the Sherman Anti-trust Act. Morgan and Republican Marcus
A. Hanna rushed to Washington to dissuade the President, but
the results proved futile. In a five to four decision, the
Supreme Court upheld the contention of the government that the
holding company had been used as an Illegal device for restrain¬
ing trade. Nevertheless, the Roosevelt Administration marked
the first effective effort by the Federal Government to challenge
O O
big business through the courts.^''
Cause of Concentration
Horizontal mergers were the main types of mergers during
the years of the first great merger period.
During the period of 1874-1919, natural resources were
exploited as never before, contributing to the industrial
expansion. Coal was needed in the production of steam in the
age of Industrialization and railroad transportation. Mining
industries became popular in the production of anthracite or
hard coal. Coal, the chief fuel for heating and cooking,
became the number one product.
The Industries chiefly effected by mergers during 1894-
1919 were petroleum, iron, steel, copper, lead, sugar, paper,
linseed oil, starch, salt, powder, cans, whiskey, cotton-seed
^^A. S. H. Kaplan, Big Enterprises in A Competitive
System (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1964),
p. 12.
^^Harold V. Faulkner, American Economics History (New
York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 427.
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oil, gold and silver mines. The most significant Invention
that affected the manufacturing during this period was the
production of steel, which gradually replaced much of the Iron
which had formerly been used.^^
By the end of 1903, the big wave of merger activity
largely came to a close as Chart I Indicates. Most of the
Important Industries, at this time, had been brought within
the control of large financial units. The public opinion had
become so aroused over the monopolies activities that the
federal legislation was demanded to supplement state laws.
Also, growing public opposition to the formation of Industrial
grants caused business leaders for the time being to proceed
more slowly. The merger activity continued at a much lesser
pace, with most of the activity In servicing Industries.26
Administrative Attitude
President William McKinley took office In 1897. A year
later, from 1898 to 1903, combinations, especially In the form
of holding companies Increased by a remarkable rate. In 1900,
there were 185 Industrial combinations with a capitalization
of three billion dollars engaged In producing 14 percent of
Industrial products of the country.
During the McKinley Administration the combination
movement went on merrily with little or no apparent desire on
25vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 50.
^^Ibld. , p. 50.
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the part of the administration to interfere. There were only
three suits against business combinations during McKinley's
Administration.
The first great corporate merger movement declined in
volume after 1902, as shown in Chart I. The mergers activities
from 1902 to 1918 produced a very few business corporate com¬
binations. Because there were a number of prosecutions
instituted in the administration of our Federal Government,
the number of cases against business combinations, of which most
had formed during the first great wave of mergers, were 206:
Roosevelt's Administration (1901-1909) 36 cases; Taft's Admini¬
stration (1909-1913) 80 cases; Wilson's Administration (1913-
1921) 90 cases.27
In 1911, the Supreme Court handed down a decision under
the Sherman Act against two of the largest industrial firms in
the country: The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the
American Tobacco Company. In the history of the Sherman Act,
however, the suits against arguments are many, while those
involving combinations are comparatively few. Decisions
handed down by the Sppreme Court in such cases numbered only
fourteen from 1895 to 1927; from 1927 to 1948 there were none.
In these cases, moreover, the rule of the law has been less
clear and less consistent than in those involving agreements
among competitors.^8
27ibid. . p. 52.
2®Clair Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business (Home-
wood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1960), p. 442.
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Following the decision in the Northern Security case,
the court proceeded to uphold the government in every suit where
railway combinations were involved. In the St. Louis Terminal
case in 1912 it enjoined the railroads owning a terminal from
denying access to their competitors. In the Union Pacific
case in 1912, and again in the Southern Pacific case in 1922,
it reordered the defendants to divert themselves of stock in
other lines and, in the Reading and Lehigh Valley case in 1920,
it broke up combinations that enabled these railroads to con¬
trol a number of anthracite mining companies. There was no
evidence in many of the cases where diverse dissolution were
required that the defendant had obtained a monopoly, that they
had sought to do so, or that engaged in predatory practices.
The court displayed more tolerance in its approach to
manufacturing. It placed its emphasis in the Standard Oil
and American Tobacco decision of Trade Commission Act.
The more important single action in the 1914 legisla¬
tion, on the substantive side, was Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. In this section unfair methods of compe¬
tition "were declared unlawful." This was a general and all-
inclusive condemnation of unethical and general-economic trade
practices. Section 5 was sufficiently broad and covered a
wide range of unfair practices, and did not attempt to apply
inflexible definitions of an extensive list of prescribed
practices to a variety of dissimilar circumstances and indus¬




interpreted to embrace new unfair methods which were likely to
be developed in a constantly changing economic world. As
Senator Ammis stated, "the congressional purpose was to permit
the words 'unfair competition* to grow and broaden and mold
themselves to meet circumstances as they arise.
Two of the legal principles included in the Clayton
Act relate specifically to methods of competition. Two types
of trade practice were singled out for special treatment.
Section 2 dealt with price discrimination and Section 3 was
O 1
concerned with tying and exclusive dealing arrangements.
Section 2 prohibits discrimination in price between different
purchases of commodities whose effect "may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce." Price differences based upon differences in
grade, quality or cost of selling or transportation was not
prohibited, since they are not discriminatory or unfair.
Moreover, discrimination was made in good faith, not on the
combination or even the actual attainment of monopoly, but on
the monopolistic intent of the defendants and on their use of
unfair tactics in eliminating competition and excluding new
competitors. And in the United Shoe Machinery case in 1913,
the court refused to find a merger of three concerns, controll¬
ing 95 percent of the output of shoe machinery, to be in vio¬
lation of the law. Each of these, said the court, had been
30
Harry L. Purdy, Corporate Concentration and Public
Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1942), p. 363.
3^Ibid., p. 362.
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given a legal monopoly by its patent rights, and the machines
they made were not competitive but complementary. In its
decision in the United States Steel case in 1920, the Supreme
Court revealed a similar complacency. It was the doctrine,
contained in this division for the next 25 years that granted
32
united immunity to monopolistic combinations in manufacturing.
New Legislation
There were some Important provisions of the 1914 Legis¬
lation. After nearly thirty-five years under the Sherman Act,
Congress, in 1914, passed the Clayton Act--the Federal trade
commission act. During President Woodrow Wilson's administra¬
tion, the commission heard 2,000 cases and it Issued 379
"cease and desist" orders in connection with unfair competition,
bribery, false advertising, adulteration, misrepresentation.^^
There were five new principles of substantive law
embodied in the 1914 legislation relating to trade competition
and industrial monopoly. Four of these were Included in the
Clayton Act and one in the Federal Trade Commission. Unfair
competition was declared to be unlawful and the right of
sellers to select their own customers was specifically safe¬
guarded. This section did not outlaw discrimination as such;
it came into play only if the price discrimination lessened
competition substantially or tended toward monopoly. It was
directed at two types of price discrimination: first, the
^^Ibid. , p. 145.
^^Arthur C. Binning, The Rise of American Economic
Life (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1955), p. 395.
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local price-cutting which the powerful combinations had used
either to drive competitors out of business or to bring them
to terms; second, the price discrimination which, though it
did not impair competition with the seller's rivals, favored
particular buyers and gave them an unfair competitive advantage
over distributors that paid higher prices.
Section 3 prohibits the use of tying and exclusive
dealing contracts. It forbids any person to lease, sell, or
contract to sell patented or unpatented goods, or to fix a
special price on condition that the leases or purchases do
not use or deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller or
leaser. Where the effect of such an arrangement may be to
lessen competitors or tend to create a monopoly.
The broader prohibition contained in Section 5 of the
accompanying Federal Trade Commission Act provided, simply,
"that unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." In substance, these statutes added little
to the content of the law. The specific practices that were
prohibited might well have been attached as- conspiracies in
restraint of trade or as attempts to monpolize under the
provision of the Sherman Act. Unfair methods of competitor
were already condemned by the common law. There were, however,
important differences. The Sherman Act was general in its
terms; the Clayton Act was explicit. The older law dealt with
monopoly as an accomplished fact; the new laws were concerned
^^Ibid. , p. 363.
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with the methods through which monopoly was attained. One
placed emphasis on punishment; the other was directed toward
prevention. Practices that had not been held to violate the
law unless pursued as part of a proved conspiracy were not
forbidden. Even more Important was the fact that enforcement
was strengthened by provisions of the Clayton and Federal
Trade Commission Acts. Under the latter act, attacks on
unfair methods of competition. Instead of being left to suits
brought by private litigants on their own Initiative and at
their own expense, were to be made by public officials and
financed by appropriation from the federal treasury.
It Is In these respects that the new legislation made
Its most significant contribution to the face of the law.^^
The United States Steel Corporation organized In 1901,
was the "combination of combinations." It brought together
In one financial unit a control over principal plants In their
respective lines of business In the steel Industry. The
principal combinations which the United States Steel Corpora¬
tion acquired with Its formation are shown In Table 1.
These acquisitions together with additional Iron, ore,
and coal property, transportation lines, and other facilities,
gave the corporation control over 65 to 75 percent of all lines
of steel manufacturing and some 80 percent of the best Iron
O ^
ore reserves In the country.
^^Clalr Wilcox, Public Policies Forward Business (New
York; Richard Irwins, 1960), p. 57.
^^Purdy,Corporate Concentration and Public Policy (New
York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1942), p. 473.
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The government brought suit against the company in the
fall of 1911, charging it with undue restraint of trade and
with being a monopoly. The Supreme Court’s decision was not
rendered until 1920.^^ The Court, in a four to three decision,
refused to order a dlssolvement of the corporation. The Court
based its opinion on the fact that the corporation had secured
the cooperation of its competitors in the plan for control of
prices. This led the majority of the court to believe that the
corporation was not in Itself a monopoly even though it con¬
trolled over 65 percent of all lines of steel manufacturing.^®
The Sherman Act condemned monopolies, but mere size of
a company does not violate the Sherman Act.
The Second Merger Movement 1920-1944
The second great period of corporate mergers began with
prosperity and the movement gained momentum after the acquittal
of the United States Steel Corporation by the United States
Supreme Court in 1920.
Some other causes of business concentration were: 1) a
drive on the part of the firms in the various industries to
attain efficient size by exploiting existing economies of
large scale production and distribution; 2) a drive on the
part of the firms in some industries (largely consumer-good
industries) to develop scales which are most effective or
profitable for sales promotion; 3) a drive among some firms
®^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 131.
3 8
Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 88.
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in various industries to restrict competition by reducing the
number of firms, whether by mergers or by elimination or
exclusion of rival, either at the horizontal level of one
industry, or by vertical integration. There is a tendency for
certain firms to acquire dominant market positions whereby
they can Impose higher seller concentration because of their
acquisitions and possession of strategic advantages over all
actual or possible techniques of monopolistic ownership of
strategic resources suppliers and/or strong stable buyer
39
preferences for their products.
The second great period of corporate mergers was sub¬
jected to the Sherman Act of 1890. This period was also
confronted with two additional acts, namely: 1) The Federal
Trade Commission Act, whose primary function is to prevent
unfair methods of competition in commerce; and the Clayton
Act, whose primary function is to prohibit the following:
local discrimination of prices; tying clauses in contracts
and Intercorporate stockholding and interlocking directorates
40that lessen competition.
The Administrative Attitude
Under the Wilson Administration, 1913-1921, the Anti¬
trust Division started 90 Antitrust cases. The Commission
heard about 2,000 complaints and Issued 279 "cease and desist"
39'' Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 183.
40
Harry M. Trebing, The Corporation in the American
Economy (New York: Quadrangle Book, 1970), p. 11.
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orders In connection with unfair competition, bribery, false
advertising, adulteration, and misrepresentation.^^
The Harding Administration, 1921-1923, Instituted 58
cases. The legality of open-price associations was first
considered by the United States Supreme Court In the Hardwood
Lumber Association case (1921). A majority of the court found
that the "close competition" provided for In the plan Is filing
actual prices and asking prices was plainly Inconsistent with
the Sherman Act.^^
The Coolldge administration started 83 cases of which
several were Initiated against open price or "open competition
plan" down to 1890. The trade association movement seems to
have been directed primarily at restricting competition. After
1890, however, this form of cooperation placed more emphasis
on development constructive activities for Improving condition
of competition and performing functions for members which did
not conflict with the Antitrust laws. This was given Impetus
by the development of open price associated. The Idea behind
this development was that the competition would be furthered
by full knowledge of the market conditions by competitors,
and the association members should freely exchange price Infor¬
mation with each other.
^^Arthur C. Binning, The Rise of American Economic Life
(London; Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 393.
^^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 118.
^^Dudley G. Fegrum, Public Regulations of Business
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959), p. 120.
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In the years following 1920, "open-price" or competi¬
tion plans attained considerable prominence. Many of them
used the exchange of price Information as a means of exercising
control over their members to restrict competition, especially
in prices. When the courts were convinced that the price¬
reporting system did result in restriction, the activities of
open price were Illegal. The difficulty was that a large
number of conditions had to be fulfilled if the open-price
arrangement was to Increase the effectiveness of competition.
All too often, all of the conditions were not met and the
association became a means of diminishing competition.^^
In 1925, in the maple flooring and cement manufacturers'
cases the Supreme Court again had occasion to scrutinize
elaborate trade association plans, for the collection and
dissemination of market data. This time, however, the court
found that the facts revealed no agreement or conceited action
with respect to prices or output. Several facts distinguish
the Maple Flooring case from prior decisions.One was that
the reports of sales and prices related exclusively to post
and closed transactions and did not disclose current prices,
the names of purchasers, of the identity of producers render¬
ing specific information. Another was the wide publicity
given to the statistics which were gathered. But there were
also facts which should have given the court a cause. A basing
^^Dudley G. Pegrum, Public Regulations of Business
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1959), p. 120.
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Harry L. Prudy, Corporate Concentration and Public
Policy (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1942), p. 59.
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point system of privacy was involved. Maple Flooring was
sold on a delivered price basis and to aid in the calculation
of these prices, a freight rate book giving rates from a
baslng-polnt to numerous points in the United States was dis¬
tributed by the association. The association also compiled
and circulated the average cost of production of all types of
flooring. The court found no evidence of price fixing.^®
Justice Stone was greatly Impressed with the economic
benefits to be gained from a wide distribution of market
information, and rightly so. Having reduced the Issues in
the case to the question of the legality of combining for the
purpose of collecting and disseminating business statistics,
he could reach but one decision. He stated:
"Persons who unite in gathering and dis¬
seminating information in trade Journals
and statistical reports on Industry... are
not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in
restraint of trade merely because the
ultimate result of their efforts may be
to stabilize prices or limit production
through a better understanding of economic
laws and a more general ability to conform
to them."^7
But the court was treading on dangerous ground, for the logical
result of full information in a market is not stability of
price and restriction of production. In purely competitive
markets a restriction of productions is occasioned by flooring
prices. A freely determined price adjusts production to demand
^6ibid. , p. 595.
^^Ibid. , p. 595.
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and cannot be a stamp of approval upon the unfortunate
philosophy of many trade associations.^®
In the Cement Manufacturers’ case, the members received
a variety of trade statistics as well as credit Infrrmatlon
and data designed to prevent buyers from frequently obtaining
more cement than they were entitled to under their contracts.
Various meetings were held, but there was no discussion of
current prices or production policies. Not all of the sta¬
tistics were disseminated to the general public. Cement was
sold on a diversified-private basis, and the association
distributed the freight rate books giving rates from established
baslng-polnts to nearly all destinations in the Northwestern
section of the United States. Despite a finding of a "sub¬
stantial uniformity in the price of cement," the court held
that no Inference could be drawn from the association
activities of a conspiracy to control prices or output.
However, there were some variations in price, and the general
uniformity was arising not out of price-fixing but from the
agreed prices which sellers met. The court did admit that
price uniformity at artificial levels might, in some circum¬
stances, be an evidence of an agreement and understanding or
49
conceded action by sellers. This decade saw 223 antitrust
cases brought before the Justice Department.^®
^®Ibid.. p. 596.
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Harry L. Prudy, Corporate Concentration and Public
Policy (New York; Prentice Hall, Inc., 1942), p. 596.
^®Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York;
Harper and Row, 1965).
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In helping with the spirit, both Congress and the
Supreme Court adapted a "hand off" attitude toward business.
Congress largely refrained from pursuing regulatory legisla¬
tion. With legislative and judicial attitudes of this kind,
business could and did continue on Its merry way.
The second merger movement occurred after World War I,
culminated In 1929, and was followed after the great depression
by a quiescent period under the next president, Roosevelt.
This pattern of mergers Is shown In Chart II.
In this second merger movement, the aim of combination
appears to have been quite different from that In the first.
Particularly big companies sought to strengthen their organiza¬
tion by acquiring companies which supplied raw materials or
used their products or carried on slmllar--but not Identical—
types of manufacturing. Instead of monopoly-seeking horizontal
merging we had vertical merging to obtain efficiencies In
production and the merging of related products to obtain
economies In management and merchandizing.^^
The number of acquisitions fell off sharply after 1929,
the process of corporate acquisition slowly but steadily con¬
tinued as shown In Chart II. During this period (1939 to
1944) the Federal Trade Commission reported that some 832
5 2
companies were acquired by 430 corporations.
C 1
•^ Donald Grunewald, Public Policy and the Modern
Corporation (New York: Appleton Century, 1966), p. 32.
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The slowing period of concentration could be contributed
to the new legislation passed during the period of 1920-44.
This period saw four Important acts pass. The Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts (1914); the Roblnson-Fatman Act
(1934); and the Wheeler-Lea Act (1938). These acts had a
deterrent effect on the merger movement. The Roblnson-Patman
Act rewrote Section 2 of the Clayton Act which dealt with price
discrimination. The Clayton Act had allowed exceptions to the
prohibitions on price discrimination by permitting different
prices to be charged where "difference In the grade quality of
the commodity sold" existed and where, "due allowance for
differences In the cost of selling or transportation" was
made.^^
The Roblnson-Fatman Act has been called an antl-
chalnstore law because It was Intended to apply mainly to food
brokerage firms and because It was a result of the New Deal
philosophy of fostering the survival of small businesses.
This Act forbids discrimination In price among purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, where the effect Is to
substantially lessen competition. Section 2 of the Roblnson-
Fatman Act makes It unlawful, finally, for any person "know¬
ingly to Induce or receive" a prohibited discrimination In
price.
In the first 20 years under the Roblnson-Fatman Act,
53ibld. . p. 86.
^^Crowln D. Edward, "Thirty Years of the Robinson Act,"
Journal of Business. XIX (July, 1956), p. 149.
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239 cases were fully litigated before the Federal Trade
Commission. Brokerage firms were Involved In 124 cases and
nearly half of these 124 cases were In the food Industry.
One-half of all the cases dealt with companies with assets
of less than a million dollars. The main arguments against
the law was that It kept Inefficient firms In business, that
the large firms could escape the provision, that It diminished
competition, and that It was Impractical because It Is based
on average and not marginal costs.
The Wheeler-Lea. Act. The ability of the Federal Trade
Commission to prevent the use of unfair methods In competition
was seriously restricted by a decision handed down by the
Supreme Court In 1931. In this case, the Commission had
ordered the Roladam Company, manufacturers of Marmola, to
cease and desist from representing their product as a remedy
for obesity. The court recognized that consumers had been
deceived by Roladam's advertisements, but It vacated the
order, finding that misrepresentation was common among the
condors of such nostrums and concluding, on this basis, that
no Injury had been done to Roladam's competitors. The
Commission was denied authority to protect consumers In cases
where injury to competitors could not be shown.
This loophold was closed when Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act was amended by the passage of the Wheeler-
^^Wllcox, Public Policies Toward Business (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc., 1960), pp. 58-9.
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Lea Act In 1938. The section, as thus amended, now outlaws
not only "unfair methods of competition, but also unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.
The Industries affected by the second merger movement
were much wider In scope than In the first merger movement.
It Included such Industries as petroleum, salt, fabricated
copper, whiskey, automobile parts, glass, motion pictures,
biscuits and crackers, glass containers, electrical and diary
rpoducts, bread, groceries, and drugs. Many corporate acqui¬
sitions were made of retail stores, hotels, and restaurants,
movie theatres, banks, and public utilities.
During the period between 1920-1929, the formation of
mergers In the public utility field was especially extensive.
The greatest Increase of concentration of the 1920*i was
largely centered In the sector of public utilities. The
utilities sector expanded relative to the rest of the economy
from the outset of the twentieth century, with the growth of
the electric, gas, and communications utilities. The overall
business concentrations of the twenties was dominated by the
large utility corporations.^®
This period was also characterized by efforts to control
the whole Industry by vertical combinations, which combined the
process from raw materials to finished products, and by
^®Ibid., p. 60.
^^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York;
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 50.
^®Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 195.
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horizontal mergers designed to embrace all competitors. The
Anaconda Copper Mining Corporation (1922) Is an outstanding
Illustration of the vertical type and General Outdoor Advertis¬
ing Company (1925) Is an Illustration of the horizontal
59
merger.
This second period of corporate mergers seems to have
played a less significant role In shaping the structure of the
economy than was the case In the first period. However, It
did play a primary role In the development of public utility
corporations
The bank holding companies developed principally between
1926-30. In 1929, there were 541 banks, with combined resources
of about 8 billion dollars, controlled by 38 holding companies.
The Transamerlcal Corporation Is an outstanding Illustration
of 100 percent control of a series of holding companies, which
In turn, owned commercial banks, foreign banks, Investment
corporations. Iron foundries, life Insurance companies, land
banks, and mortgage companies.
All did not go well during the twenties, there were
periods of hesitation and uncertalnlty In 1924 and 1927. In
1924, America's capacity to create funds for Investment In
Industry had begun to run ahead of the rate at which Industry
^^Ibld.
^^Dudley G. Pegrum, Public Regulations of Business




and business could use them. In 1925, and 1926, a boom to
Florida real estate developed and went far beyond the sounds
of common sense. Land values rose, lots were laid over large
areas of the state, and construction boomed. Lots In mosquito
Infested swamps were sold to heedless spectators who were so
sure that millions of Americans would go to Florida, that they
assumed the swamps would surely be drained. In the same year,
American Investments abroad, especially In Europe and South
America, rose to new heights. These were funds available for
foreign Investment, and American Investment bankers sent
representatives abroad as virtual loan salesmen, to promote
lending to foreigners, especially governments. Many of these
loans were made without adequate foundation as to the ability
of the government unit to pay Interest and retrieve the prlncl
pal when due within a year or two and began to default on
Interest payments as they became due. The American Investors
became frightened. These were overflows of Investment funds
from America's own domestic business and Industry to speculate
In Florida land and to purchase foreign lands. By 1927, these
newly found channels, for the use of the overflowing Invest¬
ment funds, were no longer appearllng and another period of
hesitation occurred while savers and speculators were seeking
still other outlets for their funds.
The climax of the decade—a climax which contributed In
no small measure to the designation of the "roaring twenties"
6 2” Robert D. Patton, The Development of American Economy
(Chicago: Scott Foresman and Company, 1963), p. 286.
^^Ibld.. p. 287.
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was reached in the continuing prosperity and the stockmarket
boom of 1928-29. Construction and foreign lending declined
from their height points. Thus many professional and small
businesses that had savings or credit facilities for which
they could find no use as promising as the stockmarket,
because of the collaspe of the Florida land boom and defaults
on foreign bonds had created suspicion of those outlets for
investment funds. Total sales on the New York Exchange then
A A
rose from 451 million shares to 1,125 million shares In 1929.
The booming stock market had to expand to accommodate
the tens of thousands of new customers. Incorporated business
took out corporate charters and applied a listing of their
own on the New Stock Exchange; for easier ways to raise capital
when needed, was to float a new Issue of stock through the
Exchange. National income, volume of production, stock prices,
and other Indicators of economic conditions all reached new
heights In 1929 In spite of the fact that workers and farmers
were not sharing the prosperity in full proportion.
On October 24, 1929, a violent selling wave hit the
stock exchanges of America. Distrustful speculators had
placed orders with their brokers to sell their stocks at
slightly under the levels that had been prevailing. As the
stock continued to decline, suddenly orders to sell far
exceeded orders to buy. Because of this, prices went down
^^Robert D. Patton, The Development of American Economy
(Chicago: Scott Foresman and Company, 1963), p. 287.
^^Ibld. . p. 288.
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sharply and more selling orders poured In. Severe price decline
resulted from panic selling until November 13, 1929, when the
average stock prices had fallen about one-half. The stock and
the speculators panic began to wear off after the latter date
but for the next three years, the course of the stock prices
was downward with only short rallies to Interrupt the decline.
Many stocks had lost 90 percent of their 1929 prices followed
by a depression clearly the new era of Imagined permanent
6 6
prosperity was ended.
The Third Merger Movement 1945-1959
The anti-trust laws are numerous and Involve many
specific rules for specific situations and some Immunities and
partial exemptions. Basically, however, four simple principles
are Involved.
The first and most general principle. In Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, Is that all contracts, combinations and
conspiracies In restraint of trade are prohibited. Here the
hard "trade" means competition. The second. In Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, Is that It Is unlawful to monopolize, attempt to
monopolize, or combine to monopolize. Its third,Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, Is that no comparative shall acquire or merge
with any other corporation where the effect may be to lessen
competition substantially or tend to create a monopoly.
^^Ibld.
^^Donald Grunewald, Public Policy and Modern Cooperation
(New York; Appleton-Century, Inc., 1966), p. 88.
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The fourth principle Is the Roblnson-Patman Act, which
Is an amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act. This prohibits
discrimination In price between purchases of Its same commodity
where the effect may be to lessen competition or tend toward
monopoly. The act permits price differentials that make due
allowance for differing costs arising from different conditions
of sale, and It also specifies the number of detailed rules as
f. O
to what Is discrimination.
Anti-trust cases now selected on the basis of economic
significance and potential contributed to the achievement of
anti-trust objectives. Enforcement activity Is not fashioned
to fit any preconceived Ideas as to which sections of law should
be enforced or which areas of business should be prosecuted.
While errors of judgment are always possible, enforcement
policy now Is guided solely by the policy and standard of the
statues on the basis of the specific facts In each case.
Despite some published opinions to the contrary, enforcement
policy and activity during the past year have been neither
hostile to business nor positive. For example, the proposi¬
tion of criminal cases to total cases filed In 1961 was the
lowest of any year In the last decade.
Businessmen and their spokesman sometimes claim the
anti-trust laws too Indefinite and uncertain. They say that
this uncertalnlty makes It difficult or Impossible to comply
with anti-trust standards. On the other hand, some business
^®Ibld.
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critics, often the same ones who claim uncertalnlty, also
assert that the laws are too rigid and Inflexible. It should
be evident that It Is Impossible for laws to be both flexible
and certain at the same time.
The anti-trust laws combine both flexibility and
certalnlty, both generality and details, as do most of our
Important laws. The basic principles are stated In broad
general terms, requiring Interpretations by applications to
specific situations. Thus, decisions In specific cases build
a body of Judicative precedents that supplements the statutes
and provides guides to the meaning of the laws.^^
This Is the common method of developing legal doctrine
and Is fundamental to our system of government. For example,
the legal principle of most common and general application Is
the rule Imposing liability for negligence. This rule states
generally that anyone who falls to exercise the care of a
reasonable man and thereby Injufres another must pay for the
damage caused. This Is a principle of wide application stated
In simple and general terms and most flexible In Its applica¬
tion. The Interpretation or application of this principle
has given rise to literally tens of thousands of cases that
give specific content to the general rule. The effect of
generality and details In anti-trust laws are Illustrated In
the following chart.




Cases Price (Section 7 vlduals
Year filed Civil Criminal Fixing Clayton Act)Indicted
1961 60 41 19 28 18 44
1961 90 57 33 70 11 53
1960 63 29 34 42 10 54
1959 59 33 26 33 5 25
1958 56 33 26 33 5 25
1957 56 30 26 34 1 57
1956 46 29 17 25 6 55
1955 54 33 21 25 5 81
1954 34 23 11 12 — 37
1953 29 10 19 21 — 73
1952 36 24 12 13 — 58
1951 49 35 14 29 62
Similarly, the Sherman Act Is a charter of freedom that In the
words of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, "has a generality
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable In
constitutional provisions. It does not go Into detailed defini¬
tions which might either work Injury to legitimate enterprise
or through particularization defeat Its purposes by providing
loopholes for escape. The restrictions the act Imposes are
not mechanical or artificial.
Early In the history of the anti-trust laws, the Supreme
Court declared that the Sherman Act was to be applied In a
reasonable manner, which would not Interfere with the conduct
of business by all normal methods, but would prohibit all acts
and practices that restrained competition. Over the years the
courts have recognized that certain practices are of a kind
the statue was clearly Intended to prohibit. Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that certain acts are unreasonable per se,
unreasonable must be judged by their purposes and probable
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effects in the light of all relevant markets.
In 1955 the Federal Trade Commission published its
second post-war merger study. This one covered the period
from 1948 to 1954. It shows that mergers in this period were
largely continuous of the pattern of the mergers for 1940 to
1947.










The Anti-Merger Act of 1950
The 1940 to 1954 mergers may have little pervasive
effect on the structure of American Industry generally, they
produced considerable reaction in the hall of congress. In
1950, due in large measure to the effort of the Federal Trade
Commission, Congress amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act
extending it to cover asset as well as stock acquisition which
was made Illegal, those in any line of commerce to lessen
competition or to try to create a monopoly.
The Federal Trade Commission first gave its interpreta¬
tion of the new law in the case of Flllsbury Mills in 1953.
Plllsbury had acquired two other milling companies, raising
its share in a market for flour-base mixed from 16 percent to
45 percent. The Commission held that the company, while not
violating the Sherman Act, had violated the new Section 7 of
^^Wilcox, Public Policy Toward Business (Illinois:
Richard Irwin, 1960), p. 154.
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the Clayton Act. Collection under the Sherman Act requires
proof that competition has actually been lessened or monopoly
obtained. But for collection under the Clayton Act It Is
only necessary to show a reasonable probability that this will
occur, that this Is what "the effort may be." By 1958, more
than thirty actions had been Initiated under the new Section 7,
a third of them by the Anti-trust division two thirds by the
Federal Trade Commission. In a few cases, acquisitions had
been enjoined or desist ordered In several more. These results
had been effected by consent.
The first case to come before the courts was brought
by a private litigant. The Hamilton Watch Company sued to
prevent the Benrus Watch Company from acquiring and voting
Its shares. An Injunction was granted on the ground that po¬
tential harm to competition had been shown. The first decision
to afford definite Interpretation of the era, was that handed
down by Judge Edward Welnfeld In a Federal District Court In
1958 In the case of the proposed merger between Bethlehem
Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube.^^
Bethlehem, the Nation's second largest steel producer,
notified the Department of Justice In 1956 that It planned to
acquire Youngstown, the sixth largest, thus raising Its own
share of the nation's output from 15 percent to 20 percent,
and the share of United States Steel and Bethlehem together
from 45 percent to 50 percent. The Department sued to enjoin
71 Ibid. . p. 155
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the merger, and the case went to trial. The defense argued
that the merger would make the industry more competitive,
since it would enable Bethlehem to compete more effectively
with United States Steel. The defense directed the court's
attention in particular to the market near Chicago, here,
Bethlehem had no plant and shipped in less than one percent
of its output. By acquiring and expanding Youngstown's Chicago
facilities. It would provide more vigorous competition for
United States Steel In the area. These contentions were
rejected by Judge Welnfeld. The merger, he said, offers an
Incipient threat of setting Into motion a chain reaction of
further merger by the other but less powerful companies in
the steel Industry. If this Is logic to the defendant's
contention that their joint use Is justified to enable them...
to offer, "challenging competition to United Steel..." then
the remaining large producers In the "Big Twelve" could with
equal logic urge that they, too, be permitted to join forces...
In order to give more effective competition to the enhanced
"Big Two," and so we reached a point of more intended concen¬
tration In an Industry already highly concentrated. Indeed,
we head in the direction of triply. It was evident, moreover,
that the combination would seduce competition In the sale of
many products In the regional markets of the Northwestern
states, such as Ohio, and Michigan, and In the market of the
United States as a whole. The court therefore concluded "the
acquisition of Youngstown by Bethlehem would violate Section
7 In that In each of the reducible markets considered the
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effort may be substalntlally to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly." This decision established beyond doubt
the fact that the seller anti-merger act Is to have real
force.
The most Important Interpretation In recent years Is
that In the paramount case. This case Involved five of the
major producers of motion pictures who also operated first-fun
theaters In the larger cities and chains of smaller theaters
throughout the country. The government charged that these
concerns had forced their own house In supplying films, and
had required block booking minimum admission charges, thus
making It difficult for Independent producers and distributors
to compete. It sought the separation of production and exhi¬
bition, the elimination of block booking, and the prohibition
of other condlse practices. The lower court enjoined the
practices complained of and required that films. Instead of
being booked In block, be booked through competitive bidding.
The Supreme Court found this remedy to be Inadequate, Insisting
also that production and exhibition be divorced. The reorgani¬
zations were completed by 1952, the five companies being
broken In the five producers and five operating chain of
7 ^
theaters.^
The government won another major case Involving vertical












General Motors. The government brought suit against these
companies in 1949, under the Sherman Act and incidentally under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, charging that Dupont's acquisi¬
tion of General Motors stock had the purpose and effect of
controlling General Motors and using this control to obtain
a preferred market for Dupont's automobile finishes and fabrics.
The District Court held in 1954 that the government had failed
to prove its case. The evidence, it said, did not show that
Dupont had sought or exercised control over General Motors or
received any preference in General Motors purchases. The
government appealed, and the Supreme Court, in a four to two
decision handed down in 1957, gave the opposite view of the
forces holding that Dupont had sought and obtained preferred
position in the General Motors Market.
The decision was significant, first, for the structures
with which the court defined the relevant market. The defense
had argued that Dupont's control of finishes to General Motors
was only 3.5 percent and its sales of industrial finishes,
and its sales of fabrics to General Motors only 1.6 percent
of all its sales of fabrics. But the court held that the
characteristics of automotive finishes and fabrics were
sufficiently peculiar to make them distinct and that General
Motors in Itself constituted a substantial market for these
products.
The second significance of the decision lay in the
force which it gave to the old section of the Clayton Act.
74
Ibid., p. 158 .
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The Court might have found that Dupont violated the Sherman
Act by having obtained and used control of General Motors to
further its own Interest. Instead, it found the company in
violation of the Clayton Act on the ground that its acquisition
of General Motors stock effected forty years before—now had
the potentiality of substantially lessening competition. The
Court explicitly applied in section 7 (in the old form as well
as in the new) to vertical integration, thus enabling the
government to prosecute such combination even though effected
before 1950.
At the end of World War II in 1945, the number of
corporate acquisitions Increased rapidly. Starting with the
increasing trend toward mergers which began in 1940 and con¬
tinuing through 1947, the Federal Trade Commission reports
the disappearance of more than 2,450 formerly Independent
manufacturing and mining companies. These firms, it states,
owned assets in excess of 5.2 billion dollars, or more than
5 percent of the total assets of all manufacturing corporations
in the country.
The recent merger movement (the Commission states) has
extended to virtually all phases of manufacturing and mining,
but has been most conspicuous in such Industries as food and
beverages, textiles and apparel and chemicals, including drugs.
Together, these three groups accounted for over one-third of
the total number of acquisitions. Other industries in which
numerous acquisitions have taken place were non-electrical
machinery, petroleum, and transportation equipment... The new
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wave of mergers and acquisitions which set In as the war drew
to a close has been superimposed upon the plateau of economic
concentration which already prevailed In this country.
Since 1951, the Federal Trade Commission supports
corporate merger activity which again resumed Its corporate
trend. The merger movement and activities In the sectors of
manufacturing, mining, and wholesale and retail trade accounted
for 2,318 mergers between 1951 and 1953 with 703 In 1951, 822
In 1952, and 793 In 1953.^^
The first recorded merger movement of major proportions
occurred In the United States. Its peak years were 1998
through 1902. In many respects It was the most Important of
the major merger names. It transformed many Industries,
formerly characterized by many small and medium size firms.
Into those which one or a few very large enterprises occupied
leading positions. It laid the foundation for the Industrial
structure that has characterized most of American Industry In
the twentieth century.
The second large movement, with Its peak years, took
place In the years 1926 through 1930. It reflected to some
degree the emergencies of new leading Industries In the years
since the first merger wave.
The third movement, a product of the decade following
World War II, differs from the two earlier merger waves,
^^Federal Trade Commission, Summary of the Report on
"The Merger Movement" (Washington, D. C., 1948).
^^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York;
Harper and Row, 1955), p. 77.
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having a lower peak and a wider spread across most of the post¬
war decade. The five years of Its highest activity were 1946,
1947, and 1954, 1955, and 1956. It was not a sharp burst of
business reorganization as were the two earlier movements,
whose greatest activity was bunched In five successive years.
Both In the absolute volume of merger activity and In Its slz
relative to business population, this latest merger wave Is
clearly smaller than the first two.^^
Merger Movements Compared
The first merger movement began about 60 years ago In
the United States. Table III show some of their similarities
and dissimilarities. It does not analyze the significant
economic consequences of these movements. The first movement
began after the trust era. In 1897 and set a pattern for the
future of big business In America. There were more merger
between 1897 and 1904 than during any other period. Most of
these mergers were horizontal and resulted In a high degree of
monopoly control within the Industries Involved. By 1903,
most leading Industries were oligopolistic. Was the transition
from near monopoly to oligopoly effected mainly through merger?
Professor Weston disagreed. He shows that oligopoly
was achieved by court dlsolutlon (as In the oil Industry) , by
the Internal growth of firms, and by mergers. As he says,
77Ralph Nelson, Merger Movements In American Industry,
1895-1956 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1957) , pp. 5-6.
TABLE III
THREE MERGER MOVEMENTS COMPARED
Years Type of Merger Financial Device Used Chief Industries Reason for Merger

































SOURCE: Federal Trade Commission, Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, May, 1955); Markham, "Merger
Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal," Virginia Law Review,
XLIII (May, 1957), 489-528.
MOTE: All periods began In prosperous years; the first two ended In depression. In the




"oligopoly by mergers has been a factor, but It does not
account for as many cases as the other two major Influences
7 8
combined.
J. Fred Neston, The Role of Mergers In the Growth
of Large Firms, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1953), p. 37.
CHAPTER II
THE CURRENT PERIOD OF CORPORATE MERGERS 1960-1970
The Current Merger Movement
The current merger movement has played a key role In
the process of centralization. The Federal Trade Commission,
In Its 1960 annual report. Indicated that since World War II
practically all of the Increases In the share of Individual
assets held by the 200 largest corporations were directly
attributable to mergers. Indeed, without merger activity on
the part of the largest corporations, aggregate concentration
might well have declined during the past decade. Merger
activity has registered progressive Increases since the early
1950's and continued In the 1960's (see table IV). It gives
a breakdown and the number of mergers for the 1960*s and the
sections that these mergers occurred.
The year 1960 saw an Increasing trend In mergers
activity and the decade of the 1960's saw approximately 30,000
mergers an average of about 3,000 per year.
The annual report of the Federal Trade Commission for
1969 Indicates a record breaking totaling of mergers for 1969;
4,550 firms disappeared through acquisition, 16 percent more
than the total for 1968 (see table IV). Acquisitions by
manufacturing companies continued to represent the largest
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TABLE IV
NUMBERS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS RECORDED, BY




1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Total recorded 1,345 1,724 1,667 1,479 1,893 1,746 2,384 3,932 3,932 4,550
Full
Acquisitions 1,216 1,592 1,504 1,329 1,519 1,628 1,517 2 ,181 3,748 4,291
Mining 48 74 48 79 59 62 55 82 126 140
Manufacturing 918 1,043 985 906 1,1006 1,063 1,051 1,557 2,494 2,611
Trade 127 255 235 186 207 191 188 232 441 522
Service and
Others 123 220 236 158 247 312 223 310 687 1,018
Partial
Acquisitions 129 132 163 150 278 265 229 203 184 259
SOURCE: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission
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single segment of the total, accounting for about 57 percent
of all acquisitions recorded. Merger activity, however, grew
faster In other sectors of the economy. The most spectacular
growth occurred In services. In 1969 more than 1,000 acquisi¬
tions were recorded In this sector, 48 percent higher than the
preceding year and more than triple the rate for 1967. As
merger activity attained the record levels of recent years.
Its Impact spread to embrace all major sectors of the economy.
The pattern of mergers within manufacturing and mining
firms was similar to previous years. Most manufacturing and
mining firms were acquired by other manufactures, and the
greatest number of acquisitions were made by firms classified
In the electrical and non-electrlcal machinery, chemical, and
food Industries. The trend toward a greater degree of variety
In mergers accelerated In 1969. Of all acquisitions of manu¬
facturing and mining companies In 1969, 19 percent more made
by firms In other economic sectors. The corresponding figures
for earlier years were 16 percent In 1968, 12 percent In 1967,
and only 8 percent In 1960.
In unprecedented fashion, the current merger movement
has centralized and consolidated corporate control and decision
making among a relatively few vast companies. By the end of
1968, the 200 largest Industrial corporations controlled over
60 percent of the total assets held by all manufacturing
corporations. The share of manufacturing assets held by the
100 largest corporations.In 1968 was greater than the share
of manufacturing assets held by the 200 largest corporations
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in 1950. The 200 largest manufacturing corporations in 1968
controlled a share of assets equal to that held by the 1,000
largest in 1941.
The Federal Trade Commission reported that the acquired
manufacturing and mining assets averaged about $5 billion
annually during 1965 and 1966, rose to $10 billion in 1967, and
the $15 billion In 1968. Early In 1969 acquisitions reached
an annual rate of over $20 billion. However, merger activity
declined In the second quarters of 1969 during the first nine
months of the year the rate of acquisitions was nearly six
percent above that of the previous year 1968.
These developments In manufacturing are part of a
broader picture of concentration and centralization In the
American economy. Firms engaged In retail distribution.
Insurance, broadcasting, newspapers, and the utilities have
also been caught up In this movement. Railroads have also
Increased their holding companies as a means for expanding
Into manufacturing and other sectors of the economy. Banks
have created one-bank holding corporation for the purpose of
enlarging the scope of their operations beyond their traditional
areas of activity. Large petroleum companies have participated
In a long series of mergers within various branches of the
energy Industries, but, through additional mergers, have become
widely diversified conglomerates.^
^Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission
(Washington, D. C., 1969), p. 41.
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The current trend in the merger movement, as the Federal
Trade Commission 1968 report Indicates, has done more than
merely Increase the concentration of Industrial assets In
relatively few multi-market corporations. There is some
evident of Important and increasing connecting links between
this increasing centralization of Industrial resources in a
few hundred vast corporations and the performance of competition
In particular markets. The report further Indicates the follow¬
ing ;
1) There are numerous reasons why so many
business managers prefer to grow by merger
rather than by Internal growth. All the
various motives for merger are entirely
clear, the available evidence lends little
support to the view that the current merger
movement reflects. In substantial measure,
efforts to exploit opportunities to Improve
efficiency in resource allocation. On the
contrary, there are numerous indications
that certain Institutional arrangements
Involving tax and accounting methods aided
by speculative development in the stock
market, have played a key role In fueling
the current movement. In this context there
Is little reason to expect Important social
benefits to flow from the continuation of
current trends.
2) The very profitable companies have been
acqulre4 by the largest corporations. The
acquired companies usually hold a leading
position In their Industries, while smaller
companies have usually acquired less profit¬
able firms. Most large company acquisitions
have not involved purchases of unprofitable
companies operating on the fringes of their
Industries or foothold acquisitions of smaller
companies that might be expanding In a fashion
that, as some have hoped, might challenge the
market position of dominant firms by bringing
about deconcentration.
3) The great majority of the merging companies
operated within the same Industry group, e.g.,
all chemical products, or all food and kindred
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products. Because of those companies within
the same Industry group, these related mergers
may have eliminated important potential compet¬
itors .
4) Many large acquiring corporations are multi¬
market enterprises that hold commanding positions
in one or more highly concentrated industries and
enjoyed high, noncompetitive profits in some
markets. Multi-market, who possesses a commanding
position, has the power to employ competitive
strategies seldom available to single market of
less diversified firms. This study, along with
the Commissioner's experience in several litigated
cases, reveals that conglomerate-derived market
power may he used to defend or expand the firm's
position in ways inimical to competition.
5) Conglomeration also creates the opportunity
and incentive to engage in extensive reciprocal
buying practices of "you buy from me if I buy
from you." The study shows that when large
conglomerate corporations engage in this practice,
there is a tendency to create rigid pricing
behavior, increase barriers to entry, discourage
potential large competitors from entering each
other's markets, and entrench firms in dominant
positions in highly concentrated markets. In
many instances, the impact of the various advantage
enjoyed by large conglomerate markets. In many
instances, the impact of the various advantage
enjoyed by large conglomerate corporations after
eludes precise measurement, the evidence disclosed
that (a) manufacturing industries are becoming
increasingly dominated by the large conglomerate
corporations, and (b) that there is a tendency for
large concentrations to increase in industries where
these corporations are major participants.
6) The country's largest industrial corporations
are increasingly linked with other leading domes¬
tic and international corporations through numerous
management ties, intercorporate stock holdings,
and joint ventures.
The Administrative Attitude
The existing antitrust laws only pointed out horizontal
and vertical mergers. Horizontal acquisitions have been
challenged 102 out of 122 cases or 84%. Vertical acquisitions
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have been challenged 15 times out of 122 cases or 12%.^ Up
until 1961 the enforcement agencies had confined their atten¬
tion to conventional types of acquisitions of assets or stock.
Even Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended In X950 has been
fruitful as a source of litigation Involving horizontal and
vertical mergers It has yielded a capacity of conglomerate
merger cases and authorities have concluded that cases In
this area will remain scarce. Congress was never really con-
3
earned when It amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
There Is no absolute government attitude toward mergers.
The United States Supreme Court through a long series of legal
decisions* and Congress In Its enactment of laws have mani¬
fested changfes In their attitudes* so too other governmental
agencies reflect these changes.
The Eisenhower administration had a committee of lawyers
and economists appointed to advise the Attorney-General on
antitrust policy. The committee's report on existing trend of
enforcement and Interpretation was generally approved. The
number of cases Instituted by the antitrust division rose from
29 In 1953 to 90 In 1960. Approval for the proposed merger of
Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corporations was
denied. The largest electrical manufacturing companies were
convicted of criminal conspiracy. The Dupont Company was
O
^Betty Bock* Merger and Market; A Guide to Economic
Analysis of Case Law. 3rd ed. (New York; National Industrial
Conference Board* 1964)* p. 26.
3
Clair Wilcox*. Public Policies Toward Business (Homewood*
Illinois: Richard Irwin, 1966), p. 93.
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ordered to relinquish its control in General Motors Corpora¬
tion. There were some speculations that enforcement under the
Eisenhower administration, might be cut back to the level of
the earlier days, however, this was not the case.^
At the beginning of the Kennedy-Johnson administration,
after the President had condemned the steel Industry for rais¬
ing its prices, the feelings were that the Department of Justice
would go easy on antitrust prosecutions in order to nullify his
business. But there were 92 cases, a record high, brought in
1962 and real progress was made on the enforcement of the
anti-merger law.
Johnson administration had taken the position that most
conglomerate mergers did not violate present antitrust laws.
Relatively little was done by the Jdhnson administration to
prevent or even to cool down the conglomerate tempo. Conse¬
quently, as stated by Richard W. McLaren, Current Anti-trust
Attorney-General, "The past administration permissiveness in
these matters let the merger movement get out of hahd."^
Within several months after inauguration the Nixon Administra¬
tion gave solid evidence that his administration was going to
disallow some of the very largest conglomerate mergers. The
first to feel the changing attitude was Ling-Temco Vought
(LTV), whose 63 percent Interest in Jones and Laughlln was now
^John Plain, "The Conglomerate Mergers in Economic and
Law" The Georgetown Law Journal. XLVI (Summer, 1958), pp. 673-74.
^Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 148.
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questioned. The Justice Department Indicated that It was going
to seek court-ordered divestiture by Llng-Temco-Vought of the
nation's sixth largest steel produce.^
Nixon administration's conviction, contrary to that of
the Johnson administration's was that Section 7 of the Clayton
Act could and should be used to stop the flood of economic
concentration. The Justice Department's current thinking Is
that massive business combines do pose dangers to competition
If only because of the Immense financial and market power they
wield. Another argument of the anti-trust division lawyers
Is that the conglomerate firms provide too many opportunities
for collusive reciprocal trading relationships. Following
still another line of reasoning they contended that these
mergers do diminish potential competition between the merging
firms and even oh this basis alone should be outlawed.
Llng-Temco-Vought Immediately acquired the legal services
of Arnold and Porter, one of the nation's leading anti-trust
law firms. It Is the firm of a Thurman Arnond, the well-known
New Deal trustbuster who once fought against big business but
who now uses his talents and skills to defend the business
Interests . Abe Fortas was a member of this law firm before
he was elevated to the United States Supreme Court.
The "potential competition" argument In particular
possess serious threat to conglomerators. The Llng-Temco-
Stanley C. Vance, Managers In the Conglomerate Era
(New York: John Wiley and Son, 1971), p. 161.
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Vought suit, which was actually filed in mid-May, 1969, the
Government contended that through the acquisition of 33 corpo¬
rations since 1961 Ling-Temco-Vought had become the country's
- largest seller of sporting goods
- third largest meat packer
- seventh largest commercial airline
- third largest car-rental concern
- eighth largest prime defense contractor
- one of the largest makers of copper wire
- sixth largest steelmaker
Ling-Temco-Vought is a substantial producer of jet
fighter, sound equipment, chemical electronic controls, and
aluminum wlre.^ The suit contended that LTV plans to continue
to make acquisitions specifically in aluminum, auto parts,
chemicals, drugs. Insurance, and a number of other areas.
With these and its current activities LTV is a potential
competitor of Jones and Laughlln, which in 1967 adopted a
formal acquisitions program of its own emphasizing its Intent
to make acquisitions in aluminum construction, copper products,
machine tools, chemicals and other fields.
The Justice Department also pointed out that LTV's
National Car Rental System (since disposed of) is a large
buyer of cars. Allegedly, LTV could use its purchasing power
to Induce auto makers to buy steel from Jones and Laughlln.
This is just one example showing how reciprocity could be
g
effected.
The second major case of this kind was precipitated by
^Ibid. . p. 161.
®Ibid.
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the Justice Department's filing an anti-trust suit to force
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to divert
Itself of Canteen Corporation. The suit made a charge that
ITT and Canteen are potential competitors but charged that the
combined companies have the power to employ reciprocity prac¬
tices. The use of a company's economic power to Induce
vendors or purchasers to give it special treatment, was
supposedly in the furnishing of vending and in-plant feeding
services. The suit contended that Canteen's competitors in
these areas would be foreclosed from doing business at plants
owned by ITT and its many subsidiaries. The suit further
charged, that these smaller companies competing with Canteen
would "seek to protect themselves" by looking for a merger
partner like ITT which have large multi-plant operations with
built-in clients.
In a remarkable parallel action the Justice Department
two months later challenged ITT's proposed combination with
Hartford Fine Insurance Company, the nation's sixth largest
property and liability insurer. The two companies had agreed,
a few months previously, that the new firm would have assets
in excess of $6 billion although specific grounds for the
complaint were not Initially stated, it was fairly obvious
that the Justice Department was concerned about the very real
possibility of reciprocity. Within ITT corporate confedera¬
tion there were about 75 subsidiaries, including the Nation's
largest banking company, the second largest car-rental firm,
a major home building firm, one of the two largest hotel
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chains, and a leading chemical producer. These and the other
ITT corporate components are all major purchasers of property
and liability Insurance. The possibility of reciprocity seemed
real and serious.
The Justice Department action against ITT In both the
Canteen Corporation and Hartford Fire Insurance Company cases
can be Interpreted as a stiffening of government resistance to
certain mergers, particularly to large-scale conglomerations.
Actually, early In 1968 ITT faced with government opposition
to Its takeover of American Broadcasting Company, scrapped
this proposal because of the federal opposition. Obviously,
the future limits of merger permissibility will not be set
until quite a few more test cases such as ITT's three recent
classic contests are resolved.
The Justice Department Is probably the best mirror of
an administration's legal attitude. During Johnson's adminis¬
tration a special anti-trust task force headed by Phllc-Neal,
Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, would empower
the government to break up companies In oligopolistic Indus¬
tries. The report was kept secret during Johnson's administra¬
tion but was released late In May 1969 by Richard McLean,
Nixon's Chief antitrust-buster. The report recommended new
laws that would enable the government to break up companies
In Industries "where monopoly power Is shared by a very few
large firms."
It proposed a concentrated "Industries Act" that would
apply when four or fewer firms controlled 70 percent of an
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Industry with $500 million a year In sales. Each firm will
be forced to reduce Its share of the market to no more than
12 percent. The scheme would break-up the big three auto
makers, as well as leaders In aluminum, computers and other
fields. The task force also proposed a "merger act" for some
large conglomerate takeovers, but not others. Under Its
complex formula, the Justice Department might have been unable
to file some of Its recent anti-conglomerate lawsuits, either
because the companies were too small or the Industry too
fragmented.
Many businessmen believe that the Neal proposals to
break up business would only reduce United States Industrial
efficiency and competitiveness In the world market. The
chances seem remote that any of the recommendations will be
written Into law. Congress always has trouble agreeing on
anti-trust law amendments, and the controversial Ideas In the
Q
Neal report are political orphans.
Cause of Concentration
Conglomerate mergers, like any other merger. Is a drive
hedge against losses, an outlet for Idle capital funds, and a
means to add products which can be marketed with the firms
merchandising knowledge and skills. However, according to the
Federal Trade Commission, "there is present in most conglom¬
erate acquisitions a simple drive to obtain greater economic
power." The giant conglomerate corporation maintains an almost





Conglomerate merger is the newest type of merger and
the motives are many and very complex. Following is a list of
several reasons for merger motives:
1) Technology changes that are impending. Can
we, as a small company, cope with these rapid
changes with our limited scale of plant and
capital?
2) Mergers save time and efforts. Our com¬
petitor or competitors may come up with the new
product before you.
3) Prosperity. Everyone is trying to capture
as much of the market as he possibly can.
4) A quick way to boost the price of their
stock and prestige.
5) Profit, the main objective of any business
activities.
6) Fear of the future, how efficient will we
be in terms of competing with the conglomerate
companies.
Many companies sell out because the founders of family-
owned firms have decided to retire. If these family-owned
firms sell their stock for cash they will pay a heavy capital
gains tax. If they trade their stock for securities, the
capital gain tax is evaded until the new securities are sold.
Many sell out or merge due to high need for capital investment
to compete.
^®Mund, Government and Business, p. 96.
^^"Why mergers are Popular" Vs. News and World Report
(September 11, 1967), p. 78.




The conglomerate mergers have brought about a managerial
revolution due to the increase role of the technician-professional
managers in effective merging.
The current conglomerate thrust certainly does not Ignore
this vital role of the technician-pforessional managers. In
fact, with the accelerating tempo in technological advancement,
the value of this kind of manager is even more universally
recognized both in pay and in prestige. The average salary
for the chief executive in the top 500 American industrial
firms is now edging beyond the $250,000 per year level,
increasing annually at 5 to 7 percent. Table V shows that at
General Motors the top five executives, each a technician-
manager, averaged $586,000 in 1968. The top six technician-
managers at Ford Motor Company averaged $482,660 in salaries
and bonuses. These figures do not include fringe items such
as stock options, insurance policies, dividends, and apprecia¬
tion of the company's stock-owned by these executives.
In the area of prestige the growing stature of the
manager-executives is reflected, for example, in the tremendous
increase in the number of such individuals included in Who's
Who in America listings. In the first volume (1899-1900)
approximately 150 industrialists were among the total 8,602
names listed in this first tabulation. Virtually all of these
150 industrialists were old, school entrepreneurs, or individual-
financiers. However, in the current 1970-71 volume 36 of Who's
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TABLE V
Statistics on Salary of the top five executives for General
Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company.
1968





James M. Roche , Chairman $225,000 $427,500 $652,500
George Russell , Vice-Chairman 202,500 386,250 588,750
Edward M. Cole , President 202,500 286,250 588,750
Edward D. Rollert, Exec. V.P. 180,000 367 ,500 547,500
Roger M. Kyes, Exec. V.P. 180,000 367,500 547,500
Ford Motor Company
Henry Ford, II, Chairman $200,000 $400,000 $600,000
Semen E. Rnudsen, President 180,592 400,000 580,952
Arj ay Miller, Vice-Chairman 175,000 295,000 470,000
Lee A. lacocca. Exec.,V.P. 150,000 295 ,000 445,000
Robert Stevenson, Exec., V.P. 150,000 260,999 410,000
J. Edward Lundy, Exec., V.P. 140,000 250,000 390,000
^^Stanley C. Vance, Managers in the Conglomerate Era
(New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 61.
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Who in America* about one-third of the 65,000 plus listings
are business leaders, most of whom could be called technician-
managers. On the basis of these facts it seems evident that
today’s social and financial elite includes a very large pro-
14
portion of technician-professional managers.
Although, as the pay, prestige, image, and acceptance
of professional managers reaches loftier heights it seems that
a new breed is coming into prominence. Sometimes this new
breed of managers are referred to as the macromanagers. They
appear not to be concerned primarily with making a better
product or in reducing costs through Increased scale of opera¬
tion or in maximizing profits through oligopolistic tactics.
Rather, they seem to be far more concerned in welding together
a multipurpose enterprise. Supposedly, they seek the benefits
of diverse venture, adhering to and perhaps even exaggerating
that worn-thin adage that warns against putting all of one's
eggs into a single basket. They also reason that massive
corporate size also means massive financial, political, and
technical impact.
The conglomerates surge, the growing incidence of
conglomerates whose propelling forch is a single individual as
professional manager but a non-technician, focuses upon this
presumed changing need. A quick glance at the roster of
leading conglomerates and the men who have welded these neo-
J-^Ibid. , p. 62.
^^Ibid. . p. 64.
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corporations supports this contention. Fifty of the better
known conglomerates have emerged within the last decade. It
has been said that each of these neocorporations was the brain¬
child of one man's imagination and drive. Samples of the 50
new Industrial leaders shows that only about half have earned
college degrees. This is in complete variance with recent
studies of large-scale industrial corporate leaders educational
backgrounds. It has been pointed out that in the sphere of
business, 80 percent of today's top leaders have earned a
first degree and about 25 percent have earned advanced degrees.
Yet in the current small sample of 50 new conglomerate founders,
only about half have earned college degrees and less than 10
percent have advanced degrees.
Another very pertinent observation in the sample of 50
conglomerate leaders is the fact that they have relatively
little experience in lower-level managerial positions in which
they would demonstrate their technical competencies. Usually,
in large-scale Industrial enterprise, it takes between 20 and
30 years for an individual to move to the top executive posts.
By contrast the new builders of conglomerates sport only from
5 to 10 years progressing to the top in the typical organiza¬
tional sequencing before becoming the chief executive.
Professional managers are supposed to acquire their competency
through long years of experience, shortened in some cases by
1 £
Vance, Managers in the Conglomerate Era (New York:
John Wiley, 1971), p. 65.
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Intensive education. Yet here we have a situation In which
the experience factor Is minimal and the education prerequisite
Is less than standard.
These conglomerate managers rarely relinquish ultimate
control until forced to do so. Most of the times they do not
rely on committees and often curtail the functions of their
Board of Directors. "Almost all acquisition companies are
highly personalized organization," says Martin Stone, president
of Monogram Industries, a Los Angeles conglomerate. Not a
single one uses the Office of the President concept of top
authority even though the conglomerate's complexity and
diversity would seem to warrant such an approach. In two-
thirds of the new conglomerate cases the leader either holds
more than one official title, or there Is no meaningful
second-in-command. For example, John Lawrence Is chairman,
president, and chief-executive officer at Dresser Industries;
Armand Hammer Is, likewise, chairman, president, and chief-
executive officer at Occidental Petroleum. Fred R. Sullivan,
chairman and chief-executive officer, assumed the roles of
president and chief operating officer of Walter M. Kiddle and
Company of Los Angeles when Kiddle's president. Franc M.
Rlcclandl, left the company. In fact. In the conglomerate
management revolution the role of managers are broader than
before.
There are four basic techniques for winning over the




by fleeing to a competitor, by effecting the cash palative,
and by signing a contractual guarantee. Combined or each used
by itself, one can win over top management.
Conglomerate managers are young and aggressive. They
believe that conglomerate mergers Increase efficiency and
productivity by funnellng capital to enterprises where it can
be used more profitable. These young and aggressive managers
believe that going conglomerate will force efficient manage¬
ments to do better. They are revitalizing complacent enter-
prices that have grown fat and sluggish in sheltered corners
1 8
of the market place.
These managers argue that conglomerate means fewer,
more flexible firms and on the whole a more competitive
economy. Technician-manager seems to be the key role to
Increase conglomeration.
Segment of Greatest Concentration
Manufacturing
Manufacturing has been the most popular sector in all
of the merger movements. This sector of the economy has
accounted for most of the mergers during the 1950*s and for
the years before. The manufacturing sector accounted for
about 54 percent of all acquisitions.
Joe Bains stated that in 1933 the number of giant
corporations in this sector were 78 and these 78 corporations
controlled 45.5 percent of corporate assets. Compared with
18
Gilbert Buck, "The Merger Movement Rides High"
Fortune (February, 1969), p. 90.
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1962 there were 316 such corporations with controlled assets
accounting for 57.1 percent of all acquisitions.
The Quantity Financial Report of Manufacturing Corpora¬
tions for 1967 shows that the number of manufacturing corpora¬
tions with assets of $1 billion and over increased from 52 in
1966 to 63 in 1967. These 63 firms accounted for $157 billion
or 38 percent of total assets of all manufacturing corporations,
except newspaper, in the United States. Sales of all corporate
manufacturers (excluding newspapers) in 1966 totaled $554
billion, or 13 percent above 1965. After tax profit for the
year were $30.9 billion compared with $27.5 billion in 1965
and $23.2 billion in 1964.
Public Utilities including Transportation
According to Joe Bain, the second sector of greatest
concentration was the public utilities. In 1933 there were
48 giant corporations controlling 92.6 percent of assets.
In 1962 there were 205 such corporations controlling 84.5
percent of assets. A high degree of concentration of business
assets in the hand of the largest size of corporations occurs
mainly in the mianufacturlng and utilities sectors, and out of
Bains sample of 627 giant corporations, 521 were found in those
two sectors.
Mining and Wholesale and Retail Trade
Bains' research found that the mining sector had 34
giant corporations accounting for 47.3 percent of corporate
assets. While wholesale and retail trade accounted for 55
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giant corporations controlling 17.5 percent of corporate
assets.
Factors That Cause The Slowness of Merger Trend
Market Growth
The countervailing forces, that encourage and discourage
further Increases of concentration, seem to have been struck
more fully in nearly all sectors of the economy. Market growth
and legal restraints seem to have been sufficient in off¬
setting the tendencies toward higher concentration. The very
growth of market has generally Increased at an increasing
rate. Market growth has been and will continue to be vital.
It has been principally responsible for offsetting numerous
concentration-increasing tendencies for many decades. A static
economy is much more likely to encounter increasing concentra-
19
tion than a dynamically going one.
Legal Restraints
Legal restraints have tended to become more stringent,
with more severe interpretation of general anti-trust laws
and with the amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950
to provide a much stronger deterrent against competition-
reducing mergers. New legislation, in the 1960's aimed at
lessening the advantages of chain stores, and specific legis¬
lation aimed at dissolving and preventing the emergence of
19
Joe Bain, Industrial Organization (New York: John
Wiley and Son, 1968), p. 222.
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public utility holding companies that Indicate the lack of
some economic justification In efficiency have also been
significant.
In the summer of 1968 Justice Department's anti-trust
division set down some pertinent guidelines based on market
structure. The objective of these guidelines was to tell
prospective merging partners what sort of unions the Justice
Department would not tolerate. The Justice Department's
merger guidelines generally touch on the new type of merger,
the conglomerate.
The Federal Trade Commission, In May, 1969, announced
a significant step In the direction of merger control when It
required that 475 of the nation's largest corporations must
file special report forms disclosing to the government any
plans for substantial acquisition or merger. This group of
major firms Included 265 manufacturing companies, 23 merchan¬
dising firms, 74 life Insurance companies, 9 consumer loan
companies, and 33 one-bank holding companies. In addition,
the Federal Trade Commission served notice that smaller
companies planning mergers Involving combined assets of $250
million must likewise fill out special forms at least 60 days
before the merger.
The Federal Trade Commission requires notification within
10 days after acquiring 10 percent or more of the voting stock
of another company with assets of $10 million or more.
CHAPTER III
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
AND SPECIFIC COURT CASES
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and
the Federal Trade Commission have brought legal action, under
the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, against a limited
number of mergers designated In whole or part as "conglomerate
mergers" and also against other mergers similar In alleged
behavior and consequences. The essential question Is: What
theoretical economic Inferences regarding conglomerate merger
effects may be deduced from the administrative agencies*
hcarges and approaches to the cases?
Theories Evident In the Cases
The on-golng antitrust attack on conglomerate mergers
employs a variety of weapons. The theories of economic
behavior and consequences of conglomerate mergers evident In
the agencies' allegations and opinions fall Into three groups:
1) the wealth agreement; 2) potential competition, and 3)
reciprocity agreement.^
Wealth Cases
The wealth allegation used by the Federal Trade Commission,
^John C. Naver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market Compe¬




states that there is some form of subsidy of the acquired firm
by the acquiring firm. The subsidizing can take one of these
three forms: 1) purely financial; 2) managerial, and 3) market-
o
ing assistance.*
The purely financial subsidy is one that the acquired
firm will be paid a higher price for their stock because of
the merger.
The shifting of managerial resource subsidizes the
acquired firm with additional technical knowledge and skills
that the acquired firm did not have before the merger.
The third form of subsidy is marketing assistance. The
acquired firm’s market position is better because it usually
Increases the acquired firm's market and could Increase the
advertising budget, engaging in sales promotions far beyond
the capabilities of the acquired firm. The acquired firm's
market is not national but now becomes a national market
without additional cost to the acquired firm.
The Federal Trade Commission argues that in each case,
there is an improved ability of a corporation to deal with the
rigors of the market placed by the merger.
1 shall present two cases that emphasize the wealth
issue. One, Procter and Gamble-Clorox, is perhaps the best
known of all conglomerate merger cases, and General Foods.
The Procter and Gamble-Clorox case resulted in several actions.
1) Procter and Gamble acquired Clorox on August 1, 1957, and
2
Ibid., p. 79.
772)the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint against the
merger September 30, 1957; it Issued an "initial Cease and
Desist order" on July 11, 1960. On June 15, 1961 a "Remand
Order" was Issued. The second order to "Cease and Desist" was
Issued on February 28, 1962. The final order to "Cease and
Desist" was Issued on December 15, 1962.
The Commission's decision, supporting many of the alle¬
gations of the Federal Trade Commission Counsel, is based on
five major factors:
1) the relative disparity in size and strength
between Procter and the largest firms of the
bleach Industry;
2) the excessive concentration in the Industry
at the time of the merger, and Clorox's dominant
position in the Industry;
3) the elimination, brought about by the merger,
of Procter and Gamble as a potential competitor
of Clorox;
4) the position of Procter in other markets; and
5) the nature of the "economies" enabled by the
merger.^
Here, in each of the wealth cases and in each Instance,
there is an Improved ability of a corporation to deal with the
rigors of the market placed by the merger. As previously
stated, there is some specific subsidies transferred to the
acquired company. Procter and Gamble, the nation's largest
manufacturer of packaged detergents and household cleaning
agents, in purchasing Clorox, effected a product-extension
^Ibid., p. 80
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merger. A product extension merger represents an extension of
a firm’s activity Into another product line, but one that may
relate functionally either In production, distribution or sale
of products. The products of both firms are complimentary and
were closely associated In the minds of consumers.
The marketing manner In which both firms’ products are
marketed are more closely related; both firms produce low cost,
hlgh-turnover consumer goods, that are sold through the same
channels, and both were pre-sold through mass advertising and
sales promotion.
Before the acquisition, Clorox had advertised extensively
but had never engaged In sales promotions such as two-for-one
offers, premiums, and similar programs typically undertaken by
Procter. The 1957 advertising expenditures for Clorox were:
$1,750,000 for newspaper advertising; $258,000 for radio and
billboard advertising; and $1,150,000 for television advertis¬
ing. These expenditures accounted for about 10 percent of the
total sales.^
Clorox had approximately 50 percent of the national sales
of liquid bleach. Purex, the second largest firm, had about
15 percent of the national market. Two other firms accounted
for another 10 percent of the sales, making approximately 75
percent of the national sales controlled by four firms. Clorox,
however, was the only firm selling nationally; Purex competed
In only part of the country.
4
Naver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market Competition
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 80.
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Purex manufactured a number of products including an
abrasive cleanser, a toilet soap, and detergents. Purex total
sales for 1957 was $50 million. Clorox, primarily a producer
of liquid sold, in 1957, approximately $40 million and its
assets were $12.6 million. Procter had total sales for 1957
of approximately $1,156 million and 1958 assets of $756 million.
As to the impact of the merger on conditions of entry,
the Commission said that:
"Procter, by increasing the Clorox advertising
budget, by engaging in sales promotions far
beyond the capacity of Clorox's rivals, and by
obtaining for Clorox, the advertising savings
to which Procter, as a large national advertiser,
is entitled to a position to entrench still
further, the already settled consumer preference
for the Clorox brand, and thereby, making entry
more forbidding than it was prior to the merger.
In addition, because of multiproduct firms in
large enjoys...very substantial competitive advan¬
tages in an Industry marked by product differentia¬
tion through mass advertising, sales promotion,
shelf display and related merchandising methods,
the prospects become increasingly remote, given
the substitution of Procter for Clorox in the
liquid bleach Industry, that small medium-sized
firms will be minded to enter the industry. The
scale of optimally efficient operation in the
Industry has been so Increased, by reason of
Procter’s advertising that only very large firms,
firms on the scale of Procter Itself, can
reasonably be expected to be able to compete on
roughly equal terms in the industry."^
The Federal Trade Commission said that finding a
structural change to constitute a lessening of the market's
competitive character did not depend on Procter's conduct after
the merger. It held that it was not necessary to ascertain or
^Ibid. , p. 88.
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predict whether and to what extent Procter had taken and would
take action to effect for Clorox, the potential advantages,
such as those of scale, accruing from the merger, "however,
the Commission felt that size was relevant," but primarily
disparity of such size, not absolute size, has Importance in a
merger case of this kind.
The Federal Trade Commission stated that it is the
importance of Clorox's rivals and prospective entry firms that
offer the appropriate standpoint for appraising the effects of
the merger. Of greatest importance, is the fact that Procter
possesses the potential to conduct aggressive market tactics.
Procter and Gamble-Clorox constitute a product assort¬
ment merger in which subsidizations Include not only purely
financial shifting in forms, but allow for joint promotional
programs. The opportunity for sizeable economies is greater,
because of similar products enable the acquired firm to absorb
excess capacity in several of the common activities, especially
marketing.
Moody's Industrial Manual, 1962, shows that in August
of 1957, Procter and Gamble acquired Clorox Chemical Company
through exchange of stock on the basis of 8 1/2 common shares-
for each 10 Clorox shares. Assets were transferred to Clorox
Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary. Subsequently, the Federal
Trade Commission charged that this acquisition violated the
antitrust laws. Procter and Gamble contested the charge.
The Federal Trade Commission, in March, 1962, ruled
that this acquisition tended to create a monopoly in the liquid
bleach industry and they recommended divestiture.
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General Foods
John Moody tells us In his Industrial manual, 1962, that
General Foods Corporation acquired on December 31, 1957 business
and assets of S. 0. S. Company, maker of scouring pads of
Chicago, the country's dominant producers and marketers of
household steel wool, accounting for 51 percent of sales In
the United States that year. There were only four other manu¬
facturers of household steel wool. The second largest company
accounted for 47.6 percent of the market, with the remaining
three firms splitting approximately 1.4 percent balance,
neither of the two largest firms had sales In excess of $17
6
million. However, General Foods sales exceeded $1 billion.
The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint on
September 30, 1963. The Commission alleged that the acquisition
might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly In the manufacturing, distribution and sale of house¬
hold steel wool through the United States. The Commission
assetted that other current and potential producers of house¬
hold steel wool had been or might be precluded from competing
with General Foods because of one or more of the following
factors:
1) General Foods' dominant market position,
financial and economic power;
2) Its advertising ability and experience;
3) Its merchandising and promotional ability
and experience;
^John C. Naver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market Compe¬




4) its comprehensive line of packaged
grocery products;
5) its ability to command consumer accept¬
ance of its products and of valuable
grocery store shelf space;
6) and its ability of connotations of one
of its products on one section of the
country.
The Commission alleged that the ability of General Foods
to pre-sell its products facilitated its efforts to acquire
shelf space. In 1962, General Foods was the third largest
advertiser in the United States (having risen from sixth rank
in 1956), spending approximately $105 million with all media
to promote its products. However, it received substantial
advertising discounts through its volume of advertising.^
The arguments raised against General Foods and S. 0. S.
merger and Procter and Gamble-Clorox were unparalleled. The
Federal Trade Commission's Counsel arguments stemmed primarily
from the acquired firm's market structure in relation to the
competitors abilities of the acquiring firm.
Potential Competition Cases
The Federal Trade Commission charged, in several cases,
that the mergers eliminated potential competition between the
acquiring and the acquired firms and therefore, would probably
substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.
Potential competition was posed in several forms. One form
referred to the acquiring and acquired firms which sold in
^Ibid., p. 85.
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separate geographic or product markets before the merger, but
which had a very good chance of essential Intermarket penetra¬
tion. Under this condition, mergers made potential competition
impossible, whereas, the probable entry, given certain market
conditions, of either firm into the others product or geo¬
graphic market or the entry of both into a common market, would
Q
have provided salutary effects on competition.
The potential competition problem arises from market
extension mergers. This type involves geographic diversifica¬
tion and occurs when a firm acquired other firms with their own
local markets producing virtually the same product as the
acquiring firm. The acquired firm might have in the future,
become a competitive firm for the acquiring firm either in
their markets or as entrants in the latter's markets. The
first complaint challenging a conglomerate merger of any kind
was a market extension merger.
Examples of the potential competition issue in terms of
geographic diversification occurred in four dairy cases.
Foremost Dairies, Inc., acquired all or part of the
stock, or assets of 41 dairy-products corporations in 1951-
1955. During the same period, 1951-1956, Beatrice Foods Com¬
pany acquired all or part of the stock and assets of 44 dairy-
product concerns. During 1951-1956, the Borden Company
acquired all or part of the stock and assets of 33 dairy-
product corporations and 47 other dairy product concerns, and
8
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National Dairy Product Corporation acquired all or part of the
stock or assets of 21 dairy-products concerns, one vegetable-
oil manufacturer, and 18 other dairy-products concerns.
The Foremost Dairies mergers Involved horizontal mergers
and other Involved market extensions. The Commission was con¬
cerned mainly with the market extension aspect of Foremost
Dairies mergers.
The Commission stated that potential dangers to competi¬
tion are created when large conglomerates acquire a small
Independent firm, because the merger places the remaining small
firm at a serious competitive disadvantage. The small firms'
survival depends on how well they do In selling a particular
product In one or a few markets, whereas, the conglomerate
firm's profitability and survival are determined by Its market
position In many products and many markets. The opinion of the
Commission, written by Commissioner Dixon, holds that "the
resultant disparity In size and type of operations permits the
large conglomerate to strike down Its smaller rivals with
relatively little effort or loss In overall profit." This
potential market advantage exist when a firm Is selling a
single product In many separate markets, because Its operations
In any one market are not governed solely by that market's
conditions. For these reasons market extensions mergers may
be viewed and judged on the same grounds as conglomerate
mergers.
The Federal Trade Commission realized that when
established firms enter new markets by acquiring the leading
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independent firms, they destroy potential competition by elimi¬
nating the acquired company as a competitor in its own markets
and as a potential entrant in the acquiring firm's markets.
These mergers absorb the most promising source of potential
competition. With high market concentration, the main and
frequently only restraint on market power by oligopolists, is
potential competition.
Litigation
During the three decades 1920-50, the eight largest
dairies acquired about 2,800 dairy concerns. None of these
acquisitions had been challenged successfully under the Clayton
Act. After the Clayton Act was amended by the Celler-Kefauver
Act of 1950, large dairies continued to make mergers,at a
rapid pace. During 1951-55, Foremost Dairies acquired 52 dairy
and other firms with combined annual sales of about $342
million. These mergers propelled Foremost's sales of $48
million in 1950 to $388 million by 1955.
In 1956, the Commission Issued complaints against the
country's four largest dairies, charging that certain combina¬
tions had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended.
The Commission's Judgment, on April 30, 1962, found
that Foremost had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
Commission Issued an order to cease and desist. The Borden
and National Dairy complaints were settled by consent orders
Issued April 15, 1964 and January 30, 1963, respectively. The
April 26, 1965 Judgment against Beatrice Foods was based on
the fact that the company had violated Section 7 of the Clayton
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Act. The annual report of the Federal Trade Commission, 1966,
also showed that Beatrice Foods Company resulted in a commission
order of divestiture and a ten-year prohibition against future
acquisition. This decision is currently on appeal before the
U. S. Court of Appeals.
Reciprocity Cases
Reciprocity is the third major theory implemented by the
Federal Trade Commission in the conglomerate merger actions.
It holds that conglomerate mergers may have both or considerable
structural opportunity as well as substantial persuasive power
for reciprocity. Reciprocity usually is occasioned by no more
than a recognition of mutual benefit, that is, you buy from me
and I buy from you. Reciprocity dealing may be effected
through the persuasive power of a large volume of conglomerate
buyers, thus affecting potential and extrant suppliers.
Consolidated Foods
On April 30, 1957 Consolidated Foods Corporation of
Chicago acquired Gentry, Inc. of Los Angeles. The acquiring
and acquired firms were not competitors, and sales of Gentry
to Consolidated were "imponderable.” Consolidated Foods were
a large diversified processor and seller of food products;
Gentry, a producer of dehydrated onions and garlic food season¬
ings .
There were four producers of dehydrated onion and
garlic food seasonings and Gentry was one of the two dominant
producers. These firms supplied Consolidated Foods and bought
87
in volume from Gentry, purchased more than 25 percent of the
onions produced by the industry and 25 percent of the garlic.
The issue in the Consolidated Foods case, was whether
the merger created a serious danger that the Gentry Company
would possess a protected market in which competitive oppor¬
tunities would be denied to other sellers of dehydrated onions
and garlic through consolidated's buying power. These were
reasonable beliefs that Consolidated Foods had the opportunity
through the acquisition, to realize a profit from sales in one
product area; dehydrated onion and garlic due to the magnitude
of its buying power in other markets and not on the basis of
improved product or decreased price. The Commission maintained
that it is the relative size and conglomeration of business
rivals instead of economic efficiency, that many determine a
firm's growth and success and, ultimately, the allocation of
9
resource. The Commission stated that:
"To the extent that a diversification or
conglomerate merger produces an industry
structure that facilitates and furthers
reciprocal buying, it is likely to lead
to the most serious of anticompetitive
consequence, viz., to confer upon large
diversified corporations, a crushing
weapon against small, single-line compe¬
titors ."
The Federal Trade Commission's decision was issued on
November 15, 1962 and on March 23, 1963 a final order to cease
and desist was issued. However, the decision by the Court of
^John C. Naver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market
Competition (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1967) , p. 98.
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Appeals was reversed on March 24, 1965 by the United States
Supreme Court.
General Dynamics
This corporation acquired Liquid Carbonic Corporation
on September 30, 1957. The Justice Department requested the
court to order General Dynamics to cease requiring Its suppliers
to purchase carbon-dioxide and other Industrial gases from It,
and to relinquish Itself of Its carbon-dioxide divisions In
1962.^^
In 1961 General Dynamics was the largest defense contrac¬
tor In the United States. It had more than $1,900 million In
defense sales for the year ending June 30, 1961. The gross
sales for the corporation In 1961 was approximately $2,062
million. It Is the largest manufacturer and distributor of
carbon-dioxide In the nation. It produced about 29 percent
of the total Industry shipments of carbon-dioxide, with a sale
of $21 million. General Dynamics was divided Into twelve
operating divisions, engaged In the production and sale of a
wide variety of products. Including nuclear-powered submarines,
aircraft, and guided missiles; also, telephonic sound and
radar equipment, electric motors and generators, coal, concrete,
and building materials. It Is a heavy user of carbon-dioxide.
The annual expenditures for good from suppliers exceed $1
billion and In addition, subcontracts sent out a substantial
^°Ibld.. p. 99.
^^Statues and Court Decision. Federal Trade Commission,
Vol. Ill, January 1961 to December 1965 (Washington, D. C.:
1967, United States Government Printing).
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amount of the defense business to other producers.
The government’s argument, in part, was that acquisition
of the biggest producer and distributor of carbon-dioxide in
the United States permitted General Dynamics to exercise
extensive economic leverage to demand suppliers and contractors
to buy carbon-dioxide from its Liquid Carbonic Division. Such
foregone actions exclude Independent suppliers of Carbon-
Dioxide. The government contended that Liquid's competitive
advantage over other producers and distributors would continue
to be enhanced because of actual and potential foreclosures of
12
competitors from opportunities to compete.
12
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CHAPTER IV
CONGLOMERATE EFFECTS ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
COMPETITION AND CONSUMERS
Regional Development
In regional development, conglomerate mergers are con¬
tributing their part. More and more of the nation's manufac¬
turing giants are getting Into the real estate business as a
sIdellne.
The land boom seems to be slowing down a bit at this
point, but the big corporations are taking a long-range view.
They are Investing In real estate and figuring that this sort
of venture will yield them good returns In the years to come.
The manufacturers are rushing In order to promote their
products or at least to get set up for the building boom.^
A few examples of corporations Investing In land are
as follows.
The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
Is taking over Levitt and Sons, who considers Itself the
largest builder of homes In the world. Levitt Is currently
developing large tracts of land In six states, Puerto Rico and
France.
Betty Bock, Merger and Markets; A Guide To Economic
Analysis Case Law, 3rd ed. (New York: National Conference
Board, 1965), p. 59.
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Boise Cascade Corporation, producer of paper and
building products. Is now acquiring two land-development
companies. U. S. Land, a firm that specializes In the lake-
front properties and the Lake Arrowhead Development Corpora¬
tion, which Is now developing a resort area In San Bernadlno
County, California on 3,000 acres of land adjoining the El
Captain Beach State Park In California. The Gulf Oil Corpora¬
tion paid most of the cost of the building of a new city of
Reston, Virginia and has recently acquired land for another
2
new town near San Francisco.
A big Insurance company, the Connecticut General Life
(24 billion In life contracts) Is a part owner of a new city
3
of Columbia, Maryland located between Baltimore and Washington.
The large corporations Including the railroad are becom¬
ing more active In real estate for Industrial development.^
Some companies point to the favorable treatment accorded
to real estate under the tax law as added reason for this type
of Investment.^
The conglomerate mergers have not only grown In
Industries and manufacturing but also In developing regional
sections of the country as well as building new cities. Manu¬
facturing companies are buying undeveloped land and developing
this land by building plants, homes, parks, etc., for people
2
Real Estate; Growing Sideline for Big Corporations.
^News and World Report (August 21, 1967), p. 90.
^Ibld. , p. 91.
^Ibld.. p. 92.
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to live and work. New cities are on the up swing. Industries
have discovered that to expand their products they must create
a need.
Another effect that the conglomerate mergers will have
upon regional development Is that they will build up small
communities where people are not now living.
Competitive Effects
The anti-merger act applies only where an acquisition
may substantially lessen competition or tend toward a monopoly.
Every complaint concerning mergers carries a section outlining
anticipated competitive effects. Alleged effects can, In
general, be divided Into two broad categories: 1) effects on
actual or potential competitors of the acquiring or acquired
unit; 2) effects on companies which could stand In a supplier
or customer relationship to the acquiring or acquired unit.
The charges In competitive status of acquiring or acquired
firm will effect the competitors in the following manner.
Actual or potential competition between acquiring or acquired
unit has been, or may be, eliminated. The competitive posi¬
tion between them may be or has been enhanced to the detriment
of competition. Also the acquired unit has been eliminated as
an independent competitor. The dominant position of a lending
company has been, or may be enhanced. The acquiring company's
line has been expanded to the point where the company may have
a decisive advantage over smaller, less diversified competi¬
tors, the combined company may obtain a competitive advantage
over non-integrated competitors and they may be in a position
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to achieve a monopoly. The actual or potential competition
between the acquired units has been, or may be, eliminated.^
The conglomerate merger contributions to changes in
competitive character of markets are affected as follows:^
1) actual or potential competition in the production, distri¬
bution, or sale of particular products or services may be
lessened; 2) concentration in Industry may be Increased;
3) actual or potential competition in research and price
competition may be lessened; 4) condition of entry to the
market, that is, relative easy or difficulty for new sellers
to enter the market and the advantages which established
sellers have over potential entrants.
Any conglomerate merger that Increases level of concen¬
tration and barriers to entry, particularly above "moderate"
levels, may lessen competition. Product-differential barrier
is an advantage of established firms own potential entrants
because of preference of buyers for the established firms and
products. Its sources are 1) the accumulated preferences of
buyers for established firms and brand names; 2) the exclusive
control of superior product designs through patent protection;
and 3) the control of a favorable distribution systems, when
a alternative system can be established, if possible, only at
8
disadvantageous cost to the entrant firms.
^Ibid. , p. 77.
8
Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization. 2nd ed. (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 239.
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There are several possible effects that conglomerate
activities may have upon the actual or potential competitors,
the suppliers, and the customers.
The conglomerate firm can merge with Its suppliers
thereby foreclosing It from the outlets or the suppliers may
9
become dependent on a competitors as an outlet.
The conglomerate firm or Industry Is In a position to
cut prices In one or several markets because of their geo¬
graphical location or customer groups; this Is done by a
larger firm In order to weaken or eliminate smaller firms which
sell to a particular area or customer group. The large firm's
cuts prices In the small competitor's market‘without cutting
the price In the whole market served by the larger seller.
In some cases, larger firms In the Industry have temporary
price cuts, frequently below the level of Immediate or variable
costs. A conglomerate might gain competitive advantage from
ability to accept losses In one market, making them up with
profits In other markets. In the short run, losses can be
affected by excess profit In other markets.
The conglomerate capabilities rest largely upon the
results of rational managerial behavior. The conglomerate
firm has the ability to shift resources among Its markets.
The conglomerate firm In the long run must have excess resources
to employ so that Its total revenue must exceed Its total costs,
9
Betty Bock, Mergers and Market; A Guide to Economic
Analysis of Case Law, Srd.ed. (New York; National Industrial
Conference Board, 1964), p. 77.
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it must earn a greater than normal profit. A firm having
several markets has more available information concerning
additional profitable opportunities than a single market firm
and at the same time it can better direct its research for
profitable new opportunities. It can also be a more efficient
allocator of capital, not only because it can select even
better sets of profitable alternatives as a result of its
broader base of information, but can select the best alternative
among the opportunities.^®
The resources allocation, among the conglomerate firms,
is made with the expected value in terms of profits. The
conglomerate firm may Indeed be a highly efficient allocator
of capital to its most productive uses, and at the time
assessing its marginal efficiency of capital on many activities.
With many different markets, the conglomerate may make invest¬
ment decisions with more confidence relative to their profit-
1 1
ability than can single-market firms.
An Increase, in the market power of a conglomerate
firm also Increases the resources that may be reallocated within
the firm. Another fundamental source of shiftable resources,
namely Increased efficiency resulting from the absorption of
excess capacity. Excess capacity is perhaps the most Important
Inducement for growth in a firm and specifically for diversi¬
fication. When a conglomerate merger leads to an Increase use
^®Narver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market Competition
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).
^^Ibid., p. 111.
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of the capacity, then efficiency results. The savings can
provide for the use of the additional funds for internal
shifting.
The shifting of resources may take many forms, for
example, one form is a financial subsidy of a particular
product, or a more functional shifting such as joint promotional
campaigns, branding and joint distribution of products. Regard¬
less of what method is applied, shifting of resources provide
some part of the firm with marketing possibilities beyond
those previously existing. If the conglomerate firm is going
to realize an Increase in profits, the firm usually must
possess a "staying ability" that will enable them to outlast
their rivals.
There are many ways of categorizing innovations.
Shifts in the cost function can come from shifts in the pro¬
duction function of the regulated firm or from changes in the
factors prices as a result from a shift in the production
functions of the suppliers. New uses of a product and
improved transportation of the firm's output to customers
are other innovations.
The Innovator for a given technological change can be
the regulated firm, a firm that is its supplier, or firm that
is its customers, or possibly another. The economics of the
innovative process in regulated industries, as elsewhere, may
depend on whether the regulated firm is Integrated backward
into equipment production and forward into ownership of the
appliances, as was in the case of the American Telephone
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Industry, or whether it Is not, as the case of the American
12
Electricity Generating Industry.
The regulated firm may succeed in shifting its profit-
possibility schedules by promoting technological changes in
the production process of its customers, just as its own
suppliers does. This will encourage innovation by customers
who are themselves subject to regulation. Wherever or whenever
there is innovation caused by demand, demand must derive a
positive response, which is in itself a signal for the firms
to devote some of its promotional Innovatlonal efforts to
shifting its own profit and possibly curve upward.
Employment
The regression syndrome, borrowing from the medical
field, is a fairly good index of Impending merger, name change,
or at worse dissolution. By definition a syndrome is a con¬
currence of several symptoms as in a disease. In the analogy
of Stanley Vance, Professor of Business Administration Graduate
School, University of Oregon, the application of the regression
syndrome is evidenced by the economic deterioration of a
business enterprise. Among the more obvious of the syndrome's
symptoms are the relative decline in sales, a deteriorating
profit pattern, a shrinking labor force, and slow or no growth
in owner's equity. The following example based on data from
Fortune's annual ranking of the top 500 American industrial
12
William M. Cappon, Technological Change in Regulated
Industries (Washington, D. C.; The Brookings Institution,
1970), p. 23.
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firms provides some rather obvious illustrations of the
regression syndrome.
Relative Fortune Sale Ranking
1954 At Merger Decline
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton 199 381 182
Blan-Knox 233 363 130
Wilson 37 81 44
In the above illustration, Baldwln-Llma-Hamllton, Itself
a product of merger, became the subject of acquisition by
Armour in 1965. The Period between 1954-1965, Baldwin-Lima-
Hamllton slumped in Fortune * s listing from a rank of 199 to 381.
This represents a loss of 182 in the relative sales ranking over
a decade or an average annual decline of about 18 positions.
In the above example, the other firms show similar sizeable
declines.
Although the preceding data reflects only relative sales
declines, the regression syndrome invariably shows equally
serious slumps in all performance norms. The three-firm
illustration, viewed as to asset, net Income, and number of
employees relative rankings, show the following pre-merger
1,changes:
Assets Net Income Employees
1954 at Merger 1954 at Merger 1954 at Merger
Baldlin-Lima-
Hamilton 172 312 302 480 144 349
Blan-Knox 256 395 255 403 174 323




The regression syndrome. Illustrated numerically in the
three-company sample is certainly not confined to a few highly
publicized examples. This sample reveal an almost universal
manifestation as can be shown by an analysis of the entire 209
firms which have disappeared by merger from Fortune * a 500 in
the past 16 years. This sample also indicated that the sales
performance ranges from a gain of 83 positions to a loss of
408. The ratio of losers to gainers is 10 to 1. On an
arithmetical basis this would indicate that the merger-proned
companies retreat saleswlse about eight positions annually.
Notice the relative changes in ranking, although signi¬
ficant, do not adequately reveal the extent to which these
companies have stood still or declined on a dollar and manpower
basis. During the approximately 16 years period, the Companies






Net Income +16 +35
Employees -33 +38
Evidence from this general comparison point out that the
regression syndrome--type companies grow in sales and assets at
only one-fifth the rate of growth for large-scale nonmerging
firms. Net Income for the large-scale nonmerging firms in¬
creased at double the rate recorded by regression syndrome
firms. But the most noticeable index of decline is in the man¬
power category. Although the large nonmerging firms have
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boosted employment by about 3 percent annually, the merger-
proned regression syndrome firms actually declined by almost
3 percent each year, which Is a most significant contrast.
The ailing firms are not only falling to meet their obligation
to our society by creating new jobs for a national work force
expanding at an annual rate of about 1 1/2 percent, but they
are actually decreasing their labor force and are adding to
the nation's unemployment roles.
The turnover, as a consequence of merger. Is not
restricted to the top executive group. It has been stated
previously that firms chronically manifesting regression
syndrome symptoms and subsequent merging averaged total labor
force attrition of about 3 percent annually. This conclusion
Is reinforced by a study made by Jon G. Odell, Assistant Dean
and Director of Research at the Graduate School Of Business,
University of Wisconsin. In probably the first study of Its
kind. Dr. Odell, surveying 240 Wisconsin companies acquired by
other concerns during the years 1963 through 1967, concludes
that the firms acquired, domestically, had employment rate
changes from pre-merger, annual Increase of 4.7 percent to
post-merger, annual gains of only 1.4 percent. However, the
24 companies acquired by out-of-state conglomerates which had
11.6 percent annual employment gain before merger now had
1.8 percent annual employment declines.
On the national scene. It appears that In the 6,100
plus firms that merged In 1969, 2,000,000 employees are directly
^^Cappon, Technological Change In Regulated Industries,
p. 40.
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involved. Of these perhaps 250,000 had some managerial title,
including about 50,000 executives. Also the conglomerating
firms had to do something about the approximately 50,000
corporate directors of the acquired firms. As a Judicious
estimate in the post-merger work force adjustments, line
employees averaged no more than 5 to 10 percent attrition;
staff employees faced a 10 to 25 percent cut; managers had a
20 to 33 percent replacement; in the executive category between
33 and 50 percent of the brass were let go and in the corporate
boardroom 50 to 90 percent of the directors were fired. Table
VI provides a rough estimate of labor adjustments which were
affected in 1969 following approximately 6,100 mergers. Out
of about 2,000,000 employees whose firms lost a large measure
of identity and autonomy because of the mergers, approximately
300,000 or 15 percent had their jobs terminated within one year.
TABLE VI
ESTIMATED LABOR FORCE ADJUSTMENTS IN
1969'8 APPROXIMATELY 6,100 MERGERS
Manpower Involved
Level Total Terminated Rehlred Scrapped
Line 1,000,000 50,000 30,000 20,000
Staff 750,000 150,000 75,000 75,000
Managers 200,000 50,000 20,000 30,000
Executives 50,000 20,000 10,000 10,000
Directors 50,000 30,000 10,000 20,000
2,050,000 300,000 145,000 155,000
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However, roughly half of those who were terminated were rehlred
by other firms; thus the actual attrition was about 8 percent
of all employees involved.As the rehlred category shows,
there was a functional degradation particularly in the upper
level positions; consequently, the manpower utilization rate
was further affected negatively. In the scrapped category the
actual manpower scrapping line employees were barely affected
with only about a 2 percent rate which came close to the normal
attrition rate. But the other four categories and particularly
top executives and directors suffered a disproportionately
severe squeezing.
Look at the merging scene, there Is no single reason as
to employment turnover that can be applied to all mergers.
Varying circumstances, diversity in corporate philosophy.
Individual personality differences, degree of financial control,
and many other considerations affect the way the takeover firm
uses or disposes of the merged firm's managers.
Blan-Knox Company's takeover by White Consolidated
Industries provides a classic pattern. Blan-Knox slumped from
a Fortune ranking of 233 In 1955 to a position of 363 in 1967,
a drop of 130 positions. Blan-Knox's chairman was elated when
White Consolidated Industries made overtures. White's chair¬
man and management's optimism was peaked considerably when
Blan-Knox chairman twice Issued statements to the effect that
there would be no major employment changes after the merger.
^^Ibld., p. 98.
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"Your job and mine will continue as in the past," he announced
over a public address system in Blan-Knox offices and in a
subsequent written message to employees."Under no circum¬
stances will there be any changes in personnel or policy."
However, in less than one year the headquarters staff was
reduced from 230 to a mean 40. The company’s eight operating
divisions were scattered around the country within a few months
after White's takeover, several key vice-presidents left the
firm, and subsequently W. C. Snyder. Blan-Knox's chairman
retired from his active role in the company.
The chairman of White Consolidated Industries justified
his actions by saying that his firm favors decentralization,
hence the de-emphasis on the headquarters staff.
Consumer Prices
The Bureau of Labor Statistics compiles the Consumer's
Price Index (CPI) each month. This measures average changes
in price of goods and services bought by city families of
blue and white-collar workers. The index is based on prices
of about four-hundred representative items whose price changes
are thought to reflect the movement of prices of all goods
and services purchased by typical families.
Prices are obtained in fifty-six metropolitan areas and
are collected from food and department stores, hospitals,
service stations, and other types of stores and service
establishments patronized by wage earners.
17The Wall Street Journal (May 15, 1969), p. 1.
CHART III
CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES; COMMODITIES AND SERVICES
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The period 1957-59 is used as the base period and is
indicated by the figure "100." An index of 120 would indicate
that $120 is required to purchase what $100 bought in the base
period, 1957-59. If a worker's money Income has Increased,
but his money Income has Increased less than 20 percent, his
real Income has declined.
The chart on the preceding page shows the fluctuation
of prices during the decade of the 60's. During this period,
the durables, nondurable goods and food Increased somewhat at




Industrialization began In the United States before
the Civil War. Because of the Civil War Industrialization
encountered a temporary set back. However, the decades after
the Civil War constituted a new age of Industrialization.
The Industrialization period from 1865 to 1893 was
characterized by the following: the railroad was the largest
business and most Important single economic Interest In the
United States. The whole economy grew with rapid population
Increase and Increased productivity. Manufacturing grew more
rapidly than any other sector, accounting for continually
Increasing shares of national Income and business assets.
The forms of business combinations were pools, trusts,
and the holding companies. As each of these were found to be
Illegal through time, business combinations took on another
form.
The Federal and State Administrators were characterized
by the laissez-faire doctrine. There were no anti-trust laws
before 1890, the Sherman Act of 1890 proved Ineffective because
of broad Interpretation by the courts.
The first great period of corporate concentration began
with prosperity In 1894, reaching Its peak from 1899 to 1902,
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followed by a depression In 1907 , and came to a close In 1919.
By this time the most important industrial concerns had been
brought under the control of the largest financial units.
Public opposition toward the formation of industrial giants
was rapidly increasing.
Legal restraints toward increasing concentration began
to have some effect during the latter part of the first merger
movement. In addition to the Sherman Act, the Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Act was passed in 1914. This period
used the holding company device to effect horizontal mergers
in mining and manufacturing.
The second great period of corporate concentration began
in 1920 with peak years 1920, 1924 to 1929 with prosperity,
encountering its peak years of 1924 to 1929, and ended with
the stock market crash which was followed by a depression of
1930.
The concentration in this period did not Increase very
much in mining and manufacturing but did so in the public
utilities and the distributive trade sectors, and resulted in
a significant Increase in overall business concentration.
The twenties produced a more unified national market
and the Increased use of national advertising, along with
buyer-preference through large-scale sales promotion.
The third great period of corporate concentration began
after World War II in 1944 to 1959, and also began the time
of prosperity. This merger movement was extended not only to
all phases of manufacturing and mining but to other such
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Industries as food, textiles, chemicals, drugs, wholesale and
retail trade. Its peak years were 1946, 1947, 1954, 1955, and
1956.
This period of corporate merger had a lower peak but a
longer time span than two previous merger movements.
The rash of conglomerate mergers In the past decade
started quite legitimately. In my opinion. The conglomeration
absorbed smaller companies In the $20 million to $50 million
category. These companies realized that they needed more
capital In order to keep pace with the latest technological
developments. Also, companies In declining or stagnant Indus¬
tries decided to pool their resources In other ventures.
The current merger movement gained Its momentum In the
1960’s. Along with prosperity came conglomerates with the
notion of avoiding the present anti-trust laws, and to Increase
Its market power.
There are no anti-trust laws applicable to this type
of merger. If the Justice Department merely follows older
Interpretations of the anti-trust statutes, there Is little
It can do about conglomerates. Under the old Interpretations,
violations occur only when a merger tends to monopolize a
market for a particular product. Most conglomerate mergers
do no such thing.
This merger movement has outlived all previous move¬
ments. History has shown that such trends eventually come to
an end. The question Is whether they explode or just fizzle
out
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As the movement gained momentum, the cost of acquiring
smaller companies keeps growing and such moves become less
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